Dear Ms. Keim: 

This appeal was filed from an Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") 
decision denying Lisa G. Keim ("Claimant") unemployment benefits. Claimant sought 
unemployment benefits after her position at Greenhurst Farms ended in January, 2001. The 
Claims Deputy found that the Claimant was eligible for benefits notwithstanding 19 Del. C. 
§ 3315(2). Greenhurst Farms, the employer, appealed the decision. The Appeals Referee 
reversed the decision, holding that the Claimant was discharged from work for just cause, 
making her ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Board affirmed the Referee’s decision 
and the Claimant appealed to this Court, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3323. After reviewing the 
record, the Board’s decision is affirmed. 

I. FACTS 

The Claimant was employed as a driver at Greenhurst Farms from October 12, 2000 
to January 9, 2001. She worked full time and earned twenty-five percent of the gross 
income. 

The section reads in part: "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (2) For the 
week in which the individual was discharged from the individual’s work for just cause in 
connection with the individual’s work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been 
employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in 
covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount." 

This Court cannot consider anything outside the record. Both parties’ submissions on 
appeal contain information that was not contained in the record; the Court ignores them.
On December 18, 2000, the Claimant requested and received time off. The testimony 
shows that the Claimant visited Greenhurst Farms on January 2 and informed Mr. Green that 
she would be available for work on Sunday, January 7. Because drivers leave early Monday 
mornings, Greenhurst Farms requires its drivers to call the office every Sunday to obtain their 
assignments. The Claimant did not call the office on Sunday, January 7. Furthermore, the 
Claimant did not call the following Monday or Tuesday. The testimony shows that on 
January 10, the Claimant went to Greenhurst Farms, but Mr. Green was not there. Claimant 
testified that she informed the dispatcher she was available for work. However, the Claimant 
did not call later that day or the following day. On January 11, Greenhurst Farms sent a 
letter to the Claimant informing her that because she had not called in that week, it was 
assumed that she quit. On Friday, January 12, the Claimant returned to Greenhurst Farms 
to work, but she was told to leave. At all times during that week, work was available for the 
Claimant. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate 
review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing 
Court is to determine whether the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make 
its own factual findings. Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d at 66. It merely determines if the 
evidence is legally adequate to support the agency’s factual findings. 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) 

III. DISCUSSION 

An individual seeking unemployment benefits is disqualified from receiving such 
benefits if the individual was discharged for just cause. 19 Del. C. § 3315(2). "Just cause" 
is defined as a "wilful or wanton act in violation of either the employer’s interests, or the 
employee’s duties, or of the employee’s expected standard of conduct." Abex Corp. v. Todd, 
Del. Super., 235 A.2d 271, 272 (1967). In a case involving a discharge due to misconduct, 
the employer has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that just cause 
existed before the Claimant will be disqualified from unemployment benefits. Short v. 
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd.., Del. Super., C.A. No. 85A-MY-1, Chandler, J. (Apr. 2, 
1986) Mem. Op. at 2. Thus, the essential issue is whether substantial evidence exists to 
support the Board’s conclusion that Claimant’s failure to timely contact her employer 
constituted just cause for termination. 

The Appeals Referee found, and the Board agreed, that the Claimant’s failure to call 
in for her assignment during the week of January 7 was "in violation of the employer’s 
interests" and "in violation of her duty to follow the employer’s procedures." (Ref. Dec. at 

3.) Substantial evidence exists to support the Referee’s conclusion, as adopted by the Board. 
Greenhurst Farms had a clear policy of requiring its drivers to call the office on Sundays to 
obtain their assignments for the following Monday. The Claimant informed Greenhurst 
Farms that she would be available for work on Sunday, January 7. She failed to call in on 
Sunday, January 7, to obtain her assignment for the following week. Furthermore, Claimant 
failed to call in for the next two days. 

When Claimant returned to Greenhurst Farms on January 10 to inform the dispatcher 
that she was available for work, she again failed to call in for the next two days. As such, 
she repeatedly violated a company policy of calling the office to obtain driving assignments. 
Such conduct violated her duties as a Greenhurst Farms driver. Furthermore, the record 
reflects that work was available for the Claimant during the week of January 7. Therefore, 
her conduct also violated Greenhurst Farms interests. Such violations constituted misconduct 
sufficient to provide the employer with "just cause" for her discharge. 
The Claimant argues that the failure to communicate rests with Greenhurst Farms. 
Claimant states that Greenhurst Farms was to call the Claimant when work became 
available. Greenhurst Farms never contacted the Claimant during the week of January 7, 
therefore, she never knew to report to work. The Claimant’s story directly contradicts the 
version presented by Greenhurst Farms. If believed, the Claimant’s argument would indicate 
that "just cause" for her termination does not exist and Claimant would be eligible for 
unemployment benefits. 

However, determining the witnesses’ veracity is not within this Court’s province. 
"The credibility of witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom are for the Board to determine." Coleman v. Dep’t of Labor, Del. 
Super., 288 A.2d 285, 288 (1972). After conducting hearings at which both parties testified, 
both the Referee and the Board chose to adopt the Greens’ explanation of the events. 
Consequently, this Court must defer to the Board’s credibility determinations. 

Considering the foregoing, substantial evidence exists to support the Referee’s 
decision, as affirmed by the Board, that Claimant was discharged from Greenhurst Farms for 
just cause. Correct legal principles were applied in reaching an adverse credibility finding 
against the Claimant. Accordingly, the Board’s decision is affirmed, and the Claimant is 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 
_______________________________________ 
Richard F. Stokes, Judge 
cc: Prothonotary 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board