IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY
SHEQUALA KEARNEY, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) C.A. No. 02A-08-002 HDR 
) 
NEW ROADS and ) 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE )
APPEAL BOARD,)
)
Appellees. )
Submitted: December 18, 2002 
Decided: March 25, 2003 
Upon Appeal from a Decision of the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 
AFFIRMED 
RIDGELY, President Judge 

O R D E R 

This 25th day of March, 2003, upon consideration of the Appellant’s brief 
and the record below, it appears that: 

(1) This is an appeal by Claimant Shequala K. Kearney ("Kearney") from 
a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the "Board") that 
declined to award unemployment benefits. I find that the decision is supported by 
substantial evidence and free of legal error. Accordingly, it is affirmed. 

(2) Kearney was a warehouse returns employee for New Roads when she 
was discharged for not coming to work and not calling her employer prior to the 
shift. Company policy provides that after the first incident of "no call no show" an 
employee is subject to a two day unpaid suspension, and the second occurrence 
results in termination. 

(3) The Board determined that Kearney was absent from work without 
calling in on February 6, 2002 and received a two day suspension from work 
without pay. On April 26 and 29, 2002, she again failed to show up for work and 
did not call her employer. Kearney was terminated effective April 29, 2002, for the 
second occurrence of a "no call no show." Kearney was found to be disqualified 
from unemployment benefits pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3315(2)1 at both the Appeals 
Referee level and upon hearing before the full Board. 

(4) This Court’s role in appellate review of a decision of the Board is 
limited by statute to determining whether the Board’s decision is supported by 
substantial evidence and is free from legal error.2 Substantial evidence is such that 
"a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion."3 This 
court does not "weigh evidence, determine credibility, or make its own factual 
findings,"4 it merely determines if the evidence is legally sufficient to support the 
agency’s factual findings.5 

(5) Employees terminated for just cause are disqualified from receiving 
benefits pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3315(2). "Just cause" is defined as a wilful or 
wanton act in violation of either the employer’s interest, the employee’s duties, or 
the employee’s expected standard of conduct.6 The employer bears the burden of 
proving the employee was conscious of the prohibited conduct and indifferent to its 
consequences.7 Malice or bad motive toward the employer are not required for the 
conduct to be a wilful or wanton act, thereby justifying a finding of "just cause" for 
termination.8 

(6) Kearney testified that she did not recall the February 6, 2002 "no call 
no show" but recalls that she did not attend work that entire week; she feels that she 
called her employer each day. Following the week of absence, Kearney returned 
to New Roads on February 11, 2002 to request a 30 day unpaid leave of absence for 
personal reasons, which was granted. The record below includes a "No Call No 
Show Report" signed by a New Roads supervisor on February 7, 2002 and 
testimony of New Roads supervisor that she did not call prior to her absence on 
February 6, 2002. 

(7) Kearney admits that on April 26, 2002 she did not go to work and did 
not call her employer to inform a supervisor as required by policy. She also admits 
that she did not personally call New Roads on April 29, 2002 as policy required, 
although she did ask her uncle to telephone New Roads to notify her employer of 
her anticipated absence. New Roads has no record that such call was made, 
although if made, the call would not have satisfied New Roads’ policy. The record 
also includes contemporaneous documentation of the April "no call no show" 
occurrences, which amount to two "no call no shows." 

(8) Kearney contends that she did not receive the employee handbook 
because she was on maternity leave when the handbooks were issued. However, 
she admits that she was aware of the policy that required an employee call in one 
hour prior to a scheduled shift if an employee were unable to attend work. The fact 
that she was unaware of the exact consequences of her acts, as opposed to having 
notice of their impropriety, does not preclude discharge for wilful misconduct.9 

(9) In considering the testimony of all parties at both the hearing before the 
Appeals Referee and the Board hearing, the documents supporting the "no call no 
show" incidents, and Kearney’s own admissions, I find that the Board had 
substantial evidence to find that Kearney violated New Roads’ express attendance 
policy at least twice. These violations of the employer’s policy are clearly adverse 
to the employer’s interest, the employee’s duties, and the employee’s expected 
standard of conduct. 

Accordingly, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is 
AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
President Judge 
cmh 
oc: Prothonotary 
xc: Order distribution