IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
DARNITA L. JEFFERS, )
)
Appellant, )
)
) C.A. No. 00A-12-001-JRJ
)
THE LENSFEST GROUP, )
d/b/a SUBURBAN CABLE, )
and UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE )
APPEAL BOARD, )
)
Appellees. )
O R D E R
Submitted: July 12, 2001
Decided: August 3, 2001
Appeal from a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Decision Affirmed.
Jeffrey M. Boyer, Esquire, Huffman Law Practices, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellant Darnita L. Jeffers
Paula C. Witherow, Esquire, Cooch and Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellee The Lensfest Group.
JURDEN, Judge
Having reviewed the parties submissions, as well as the
record below, the Court finds and concludes as follows:
1. Posture. In August 1999, Claimant filed with the
Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment a petition for
unemployment insurance benefits after being terminated from
her job with The Lenfest Group, d/b/a Suburban Cable TV
("Employer" or "Suburban"). A claims deputy granted
Claimant’s petition, and Employer appealed. After
conducting a hearing, an appeals referee reversed the claims
deputy, and Claimant appealed to the Board. The Board heard
further evidence and granted Claimant’s petition for
benefits. Employer appealed to the Superior Court.
2. This Court reversed the Board’s decision and
remanded the cause for application of the appropriate theory
of law and resolution of conflicts in the evidence.1 On
remand, the Board held a hearing and issued a decision on
November 14, 2000, denying Claimant’s petition. Claimant
filed a timely appeal to this Court. Briefing is complete,
Lenfest Group d/b/a Suburban Cable v. Jeffers & UIAB, Del.
Super., C. A. No. 00A-01-006, Barron, J. (Aug. 14, 2000) (ORDER).
and the issues are ripe for decision.
3. Facts. Claimant worked for Suburban as a customer
service representative from June 29, 1998, through August
25, 1999. Her sole responsibility was to answer telephone
calls from customers and resolve as many problems as
possible.
4. In May 1999, Claimant received a verbal warning
because she had logged an unacceptably high number of "short
calls," which Employer defines as any call lasting less than
10 seconds. Employer monitored the number of short calls
logged by each customer representative because a short call
was usually one that is either unresolved or unanswered.
The acceptable number of short calls was 20 per month.
Employer had an informal discussion (also referred to as a
counseling session) with any employee who logged more than
20 short calls in one month. During May 1999, Claimant had
a total of 274 short calls.
5. Immediately following the counseling session,
Claimant signed a document, prepared by Employer, which
verified the warning and stated that, if Claimant’s
performance did not improve, there would be "further
disciplinary action up to and including termination."
Claimant logged 87 short calls in June, 126 in July, and 48
in August. In July, she logged a 2440 total calls, an
unduly high number, which often indicates that the customer
representative is not staying on the line long enough to
handle the caller’s question or problem. Claimant’s average
time per call was 1 minute and 55 seconds, compared to an
expected 3 to 6 minutes per call.
6. When confronted with her record of short calls,
Claimant asserted that her short calls were attributable to
a problem with her sign-on number, but the technical
personnel were unable to find a problem. Because of
continuing concerns about Claimant’s performance, in August
1999, management decided that Claimant was one of several
employees whose performance warranted further evaluation.
Claimant’s team leader, Eric Gilcrest, monitored Claimant’s
calls on August 18, 19 and 20, 1999.
7. On the afternoon of August 25, 1999, Mike
Collison, customer satisfaction manager, monitored
Claimant’s calls after the lunch break. During a 10-minute
time span, Collison noted 5 to 7 unanswered calls. A
colleague joined him in listening for another 5 minutes,
when 6 to 7 calls went unanswered. Collison then asked
Claimant to accompany him to the office of Cathy Joseph,
manager of Human Resources. Collison asked Claimant if
there were any problems with her equipment, and she said no.
After an interview of a which lasted approximately 10
minutes, Claimant was terminated and subsequently filed for
unemployment benefits.
8. The Board’s decision following remand. After
conducting a second hearing, the Board issued a decision
denying Claimant’s petition on November 1, 2000. The Board
made the following findings of fact. First, Claimant had
been counseled on short calls on June 3, 1999, and warned
that further problems in this area could result in
termination. Second, between June and August 25, 1999,
Claimant was informally advised of the continuing problem by
her supervisor during one or two of the weekly team
meetings. Third, Claimant’s number of short calls decreased
during the summer months of 1999, but her performance in
this area was still a problem. Fourth, Claimant had been
given almost three months to resolve her problem with short
calls and had not done so. Fifth, Claimant’s termination
was not part of a pattern of layoffs. Based on these
findings, the Board concluded that Claimant’s continued
pattern of excessive short calls and her failure to answer
the phone on August 25 constituted wanton misconduct in
violation of her duties, and that she was discharged for
just cause in connection with her work. Having found just
cause on these issues, the Board declined to rule on the
additional reasons for the termination offered by Employer.
9. Issues on appeal. Claimant argues that the Board
erred in concluding that Claimant’s pattern of excessive
short calls constituted just cause for dismissal. Claimant
also argues that the Board erred in concluding that
Claimant’s conduct on August 25, 1999, constituted just
cause. Employer responds that the Board’s factual findings
are supported by substantial evidence and that the decision
is free from legal error.
10. Standard of review. The function of this Court on
review of a Board decision is to determine whether the
decision is supported by substantial evidence3 and is free
from legal error. Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. This Court does not weigh the
evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make
factual findings in the first instance. Rather, this
Court’s role is to determine whether the evidence is legally
adequate to support the Board’s findings.
11. Just cause for dismissal. An individual is
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits when he is
"discharged from the individual’s work for just cause in
connection with the individual’s work...." Just cause
means wilful or wanton misconduct in violation of the
employer’s interest, the employee’s duties, or the
employee’s expected standard of conduct. "Wilful"
misconduct requires a showing of actual, specific or evil
intent, whereas "wanton" misconduct requires a showing of
heedless, malicious or reckless conduct but not a bad motive
or an intent to cause harm. The employer bears the burden
of showing that an employee was terminated for just cause.
12. Excessive short calls. Claimant argues first
that the Board erred in finding that her pattern of short
calls constituted just cause for termination. She asserts
that, as a matter of law, Employer condoned Claimant’s
number of short calls during July and August and therefore
could not terminate Claimant on the basis of short calls.
In support of this contention, Claimant relies on Oddo v.
Charcoal Pit.12
13. In Oddo, the claimant, Mr. Oddo, and his employer
agreed that claimant would work part-time until his annual
wages met the allowable social security income cap for
retired persons. For six months, all went well, but
thereafter, Mr. Oddo and his supervisor began to disagree
about scheduling. During their third argument, claimant was
fired. This Court found that Mr. Oddo had not been
terminated for just cause because the employer had agreed to
accommodate him and the employer never warned him that
Del. Super., 1989 WL 48581, Herlihy, J. (April 17, 1989).
continued inflexibility as to scheduling could lead to
termination. Furthermore, Mr. Oddo’s employer was satisfied
with his job performance and only concerned about his
scheduling flexibility.
14. In the case at bar, Claimant was warned about
excessive short calls and signed a verification of the
warning which indicated that she could be terminated if her
performance did not improve. Furthermore, Employer in no
way accommodated Claimant’s performance level. In sum, Oddo
does not support Claimant’s position. The Court concludes
that the Board did not err as a matter of law when it ruled
that Claimant’s short calls constituted just cause for
dismissal.
15. Claimant also challenges the Board’s factual
findings on short calls. Specifically, Claimant asserts
that because Claimant’s number of short calls for August
decreased to 48, Claimant’s termination was not for just
cause. This argument ignores the fact that the acceptable
number of short calls was 20 per month. Claimant was made
aware of Employer’s expectations about short calls in the
June 3 counseling session and also in weekly team meetings.
The Board explicitly accepted Gilcrest’s testimony that he
regularly addressed this topic with his team members because
customer service was their sole responsibility and that he
had discussed it with Claimant on one or two occasions
between June and August 1999. There is substantial record
evidence to support the Board’s factual findings regarding
short calls.
16. The Court concludes that the Board did not err
when it concluded that Claimant’s continued pattern of
excessive short calls constituted just cause for
dismissal.
Another indication of Claimant’s poor performance was the length
of her calls. Her average handle time was 1:55 minutes, compared to
the 4 to 5 minutes normally required to resolve a problem or even
answer a question. Cathy Joseph, manager, human resources, testified
that the reports indicated that Claimant often answered calls but
immediately put the caller on hold, often causing the caller to hang
up. Because these calls lasted longer than 20 seconds, they were not
recorded as short calls. In this way, Claimant took numerous calls
without actually speaking to any customers. The Board determined that
it did not need to reach this issue because it found just cause on the
issue of short calls.
17. Claimant’s conduct on August 25, 1999. Claimant
argues that the Board erred in finding that Claimant’s
failure to answer the phone on August 25 was just cause for
dismissal. The Court notes first that the Board found that
the events of August 25 in combination with the pattern of
short calls constituted wanton misconduct in violation of
Claimant’s duties. In regard to August 25, the Board
pointed out that Claimant had been given three months to
correct her performance problems and had not done so.
Because Claimant had been warned that her performance was
less than satisfactory, the Board found that her failure to
plug in her earphones or even to even notice the blinking
lights was wanton misconduct in violation of her duties and
Employer’s interests. Wanton misconduct means heedless,
malicious or reckless misconduct and does not require a
showing of bad motive or intent to cause harm.
18. In light of Claimant’s awareness of Employer’s
concern about short calls, the Court concludes that the
record evidence is legally adequate to support the Board’s
finding that Claimant’s behavior on August 25 constituted
wanton misconduct of her duties and Employer’s expected
standard of conduct.
For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the
Board’s decision denying Claimant’s petition for
unemployment insurance benefits must be and hereby is
Affirmed.
It Is So ORDERED.
________________________________
______
Jan R. Jurden, Judge