SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
RICHARD F. STOKES
JUDGE P.O. BOX 746
COURTHOU SE
GEORGETO WN, DE 19947
Alan G. Davis, Esquire Lucille Ghigliotti
Henry Clay Davis III, P.A. 363 Beech Drive
P.O. Box 744Lewes, Delaware 19958
Georgetown, Delaware 19947
Date Submitted: September 16, 2002
Date Decided: December 30, 2002
Re: In & Out Car Care, Inc. v. UIAB and Lucille Ghigliotti
C.A. No. 02A-02-003
Dear Mr. Davis and Ms. Ghigliotti:
This case comes before the Court on appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board
(the "Board"), which reversed the Appeals Referee’s decision to deny Lucille Ghigliotti ("Claimant")
unemployment compensation benefits. The Board’s decision is affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case stems f rom th e empl oyment relationsh ip bet ween Claima nt and her employer, In
& Out Car Care, Inc. ("Employer"), located in Millsboro, Delaware. Claimant was hired as a
receptionist in June of 1999, working full time and earning $10.45 an hour. Employer’s general
manager resigned in December of 2000. From that point on, Claimant testified that work was piled
on her. Claimant testified that she repeatedly complained about the workload and requested that
Employer hire someone to assist her. In early August of 2001, Employer introduced a new computer
system to the workplace. Claimant was responsible for learning the new system, which she found
difficult to understand, as well as her regular receptionist duties. At about the same time, Employer
hired someone to work with Claimant at the front desk. On September 4, 2001, while the new hire
had the day off, Claimant became frustrated and told Employer that she could not endure the work
conditions any longer. Employer indicated that Claimant was free to leave if she so desired.
Claimant left the premises.
The Appeals Referee found that Claimant was not entitled to relief because she left work
voluntarily and without good cause attributable to such work. Claimant appealed to the Board,
which reversed and made the following findings of fact:
The Board accepts claimant’s testimony as more credible than that of employer’s
representatives and finds that claimant continually complained to management about
being overworked and being unable to use the computer system without obtaining
any relief from them. While employer may have told claimant not to worry about
learning the system quickly, claimant was at the front counter and needed to use the
computer to do her job, and was not given sufficient time to learn the system outside
of her job duties. Claimant’s stress with the additional hours and the new computer
system were clearl y related to her work and the Board finds that claimant properly
exhausted her administrative remedies, by complaining to her superiors before
quitting.
The Board awarded benefits to Claimant. Employer’s appeal is before the Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Employer presents the following questions for review:
1. Did the Board err in failing to allow Employer representatives to testify about other
circumstances, including Claimant’s personal issues, that may have been the real cause of
Claimant’s decision to quit?
2. Did the Board err in failing to reconcile the inconsistent testimony of Claimant?
3. Did the Board err in failing to consider the attempts of Employer to address the complaints
of Claimant?
The Court will address these issues in turn.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The duty of this Court when acting on an appeal from the Board is to determine whether the
Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. Johnson v.
Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965); Devine v. Advanced Power Control, Inc., 663 A.2d
1205, 1209 (Del. 1995) (cit ing General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960));
General Motors v. Jarrell, 493 A.2d 978, 980 (Del. 1985). Substantial evidence means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Oceanport Indus.,
Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Battista v. Chrysler, 517 A.2d
295, 297 (Del. 1986). The Superior Court, when sitting as an appellate court, does not weigh the
evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. Johnson v. Chrysler
Corp., 213 A.2d at 66. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the
agency’s factual findings. 29 Del. C. § 10142(d). The Superior Court may not overturn a factual
finding of the Industrial Accident Board unless there is "no satisfactory proof" supporting the Boar d's
finding. Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d at 67. It is well settled that "[t]he credibility of the
witnesses, the weight o f their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are for
the Board to determine." Coleman v. Dept. of Labor, 288 A .2d 28 5, 287 (Del. Super . 1972 ). In
reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court will consider the record in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing below. General Motors Corp. v. Guy, Del. Super., C.A. No. 90A-
JL-5, Gebelein, J. (August 16, 1991). As to errors of law, however, the Court’s review is plenary.
Brooks v. Johnson, 560 A.2d 1001, 1002 (Del. 1989).
B. Voluntary Termination with Good Cause Attributable to Work
Claimant was not fired but voluntarily terminated her employment relationship with
Employer. Accordingly, section 3315 of Title 19 of the Delaware Code controls. The law reads, in
relevant part:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(1) For the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to such work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been
employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned
wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit
amount.
19 Del. C. § 3315. Under this section, the claimant has the burden of proving "good cause."
Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 1971). Unless an
employee does "something akin to exhausting his administrative remedies by, for example, seeking
to have the situation corrected by proper notice to his employer," good cause to quit one’s job does
not exist "merely because there is an undesirable or unsafe situation connected with his
employment." O’Neal’s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 269 A.2d 247, 249 (Del. Super.
1970).
Employer challenges the Board’s finding of good cause.
1. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence
Employer argues that the Board improperly excluded evidence relevant to the question of
why Claimant left work. Employer asserts that Claimant left work because personal reasons
demanded that she do so.
The rules of evidence do not apply strictly to administrative hearings. Sirkin & Levine v.
Timmons, 652 A.2d 1079, 1084 (Del. Super. 1994). "Exclusion of relevant, material, and competent
evidence is grounds for reversal if the refusal is prejudicial." Ridings v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal
Bd., 407 A.2d 238, 240 (Del. Super. 1979). While the Board must give a party "every opportunity
to present competent evidence relevant to [its] case," it does retain the discretion to limit testimony
and exhibits in a reasonable manner. Machamer v. Hepbron Vending Co., Del. Super., C.A. No.
96A-03-002, Carpenter, J. (Nov. 27, 1996). Generally one must preserve an evidentiary ruling for
appeal by making a proffer as to the evidence it seeks to introduce and make an argument for its
inclusion on the record. Employer did not present a proffer at the Board hearing, nor has it presented
one on appeal. Nonetheless, the Court will address the argument on its merits.
Employer implies Claimant left work because she was stressed about her personal life,
specifically, her husband’s illness. Testimony from both Claimant and Employer’s representative,
that delved into Claimant’s personal situation, was cut short by the Board. After a review of the
record, the Court concludes that testimony concerning Claimant’s personal situation arose in the
context of explaining why Claimant wished to work additional hours.1 The Board implicitly
1 In one instance, Claimant was in the process of explaining to the Board why she sought
additional hours; in another, Claimant noted that she needed to work additional hours because
she had to take time off from work due to her husband’s illness. At no point did Claimant imply
that this situation affected her job in any fashion other than providing motivation to remain
employed. Claimant’s situation is distinguishable from the cases cited by Employer. See Mifflin
v. Polo Factory Store, Del. Super., C.A. No. 01A-04-002, Stokes, J. (Oct. 18, 2001) (employee
conceded that she made a personal decision to quit work in order to care for her ailing mother);
Jackson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., C.A. No. 95A-06-002, Graves, J. (Jan. 26, 1996)
(employee’s personal circumstances led him to request less hours).
determined that testimony regarding these circumstances was irrelevant. The Court concurs with the
Board’s findings and declines to find that relevant evidence was excluded.
2. Substantial Evidence to Support Board’s Conclusion
Employer’s final two arguments challenge the existence of substantial evidence. The first
of these is Employer’s assertion that the Board failed to resolve inconsistencies in Claimant’s
testimony as Employer alleges the Board was required to do.2 In support of this argument, Employer
cites Lavery v. Hocker’s Superthrift, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96A-02-002, Lee, J. (Sept. 20, 1996).
In Lavery, the Board found the testimony of employer-Hocker to be more credible than that of
claimant-Lavery. Employer-Hocker offered several conflicting explanations for claimant-Lavrey’s
reduction in hours. The Superior Court was troubled by the Board’s failure to specify upon which
rationale its decision rested and held that the factual inconsistencies must be reconciled. Id.
Employer points to several small discrepancies in Claimant’s testimony. The Board found
that Claimant complained frequently to her superiors about her workload and registered her
complaints with respect to the new computer system. The Board also found that Claimant’s concerns
went unaddressed to the extent that the changed working conditions rose to the level of good cause
for her resignation. These findings are supported by the record. Claimant continued to work under
increased stress for nine months following the departure of Employer’s general manager.
Discrepancies with respect to the exact days on which, or the number of times complaints were
made, do not undermine the Board’s factual findings.
Lastly, Employer argues that Claimant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Employer contends that Claimant should have permitted Employer to address her complaints.
Section 3315(1) does not impose a strict requirement that an employee exhaust all potential
remedies before she has good cause to quit. Sandefur v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., Del. Super.,
[no number in original], Goldstein, J. (Aug. 27, 1993). The employee’s obligation is to "inform an
employer of resolvable problems, and to make a good faith effort to resolve them, before simply
leaving." Id.
Claimant continuously voiced her concerns to her supervisors at work over a nine month
period. Employer offered Claimant no hope that her concerns would be addressed. Employer’s
argument is meritless.
CONCLUSION
A review of the record satisfies the Court that the Board’s findings and decision are
supported by substantial evidence and are free from legal error. Considering the foregoing, the
decision of the Board granting unemployment benefits is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very Truly Yours,
Richard F. Stokes
cc: Prothonotary’s Office