IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY 
RONNIE R. GRIFFIN, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) C.A. No. 00A-10-008 WCC 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DAIMLER CHRYSLER ) 
and UNEMPLOYMENT ) 
INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD, ) 
) 
Appellees. ) 
Submitted: January 11, 2001 
Decided: April 27, 2001 
O R D E R 
Appellee Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s Motion to Dismiss. 
Granted. 
Ronnie R. Griffin, 55-1 West Chestnut Hill Road, Newark, Delaware 19713. Pro 
se Appellant. 
James J. Hanley, Esquire, Carvel State Office Building, 820 N. French Street, 6th 
Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801. Attorney for Appellee Unemployment Insurance 
Appeal Board. 
CARPENTER, J. 

This 27th day of April, 2001, after considering the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeal Board’s ("Board”) motion to dismiss Ronnie R. Griffin’s ("Appellant”) appeal 
from the decision of the Board, it appears that: 

1. The Appellant was employed by Daimler Chrysler ("Chrysler”) as a 
technician from January 24, 1989 until March 3, 2000. When the Appellant was 
discharged from Chrysler for failure to provide sufficient medical documentation for 
an injury, he filed a claim for unemployment benefits. A Claims Deputy from the 
Department of Labor disqualified the Appellant for receipt of benefits because the 
Appellant was discharged with just cause in connection with his work.1 The 
Appellant appealed this decision to the Appeals Referee, who affirmed the Claims 
Deputy’s decision. The Appeals Referee found that the Appellant was discharged 
from Chrysler for just cause, in that he failed to comply with Chrysler’s policy after 
repeated chances. 

The Deputy determined that the Appellant failed to fulfill Chrysler’s reinstatement 
requirements.

2. Thereafter, the Appellant appealed the Referee’s decision to the Board, 
and the Board held a hearing on September 27, 2000. The Appellant failed to appear 
for the hearing and did not notify the Board before or after the hearing with the reason 
for his absence. As such, the Board dismissed the appeal because the Appellant failed 
to appear. Consequently, the Appellant, pro se, appealed the Board’s decision to this 
Court, arguing the merits of the case.2 Prior to the filing of any briefs, the Board 
moves to dismiss the appeal as a result of the Appellant’s failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies under 19 Del. C. §3322. 

3. Superior Court Civil Rule 72(i) governs the grounds upon which the 
Court may dismiss an appeal upon a motion by any party. It states, in part, 
"[d]ismissal may be ordered for untimely filing of an appeal, for appealing an 
unappealable interlocutory order, for failure of a party diligently to prosecute the 
appeal, for failure to comply with any rule, statute, or order of the Court or for any 
other reason deemed by the Court to be appropriate.

(note: The Appellant specifically stated in his grounds for appeal: 

   (1) The amount of information required by Daimler Chrysler this time was more 
   extensive than had been required on previous reinstatements. 
   
   (2) Chrysler had been the one who’s [sic] doctor provided the code or "PQX that 
   precipitated my roll out from work.)

4. According to 19 Del. C. §3322(a), "judicial review [of the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s decision]...shall be permitted only after any 
party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted all administrative remedies as 
provided by this chapter." "The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief must 
be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act." Only after the 
completion of the administrative process may a court review the claim. The Board 
argues that dismissal is warranted because the Appellant failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies by failing to attend the Board hearing and thus the Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 

5. In Wilson v. Servalli Restaurant, this Court addressed the issue, stating 
that it could only review a Board decision after the aggrieved party had exhausted all 
his administrative remedies, and because the appellant failed to attend the Board 
hearing and did not present his case to the Board, he did not exhaust all administrative 
remedies. Thus, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the merits of the 
case. While the Wilson Court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss because under 
the facts of the case, the Court still had jurisdiction to determine whether the Board 
abused its discretion in denying the request for a rehearing, the fundamental principle 
of exhaustion remains the law of this jurisdiction. 

6. In the case sub judice, the Court similarly finds that it lacks jurisdiction 
to address the merits of the case. The Appellant failed to appear at the Board hearing, 
and the merits were not addressed by the Board. As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction 
to review the merits of the case because the Appellant did not exhaust all 
administrative remedies by not presenting his case to the Board. 
However, unlike Wilson, the Court will grant the Board’s motion to dismiss. 
In Wilson, the Court denied the motion and allowed the appeal to proceed because 
the appellant had specifically cited grounds concerning the Board’s alleged abuse of 
discretion. But, in this case, the Appellant’s grounds for appeal only concerned the 
merits of the case, and he did not assert any allegations concerning the Board’s abuse 
of discretion in dismissing the appeal for his failure to appear. In fact, the Appellant 
admitted in this response to the Board’s motion to dismiss that his decision not to 
attend the Board hearing was a conscious choice based upon his financial condition 
at the time.10 He never requested to reschedule nor attempted to explain to the Board 
the reason the hearing date was inconvenient. He simply failed to appear. By doing 
so, he forfeited his right to appeal. 

7. As such, the Court grants the motion to dismiss the appeal under 
Superior Court Civil Rule 72(i), because as a result of the Appellant’s failure to 
exhaust his administrative remedies, the Court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits 
In his response to the Board’s motion to dismiss, the Appellant stated: 

First, I must address the matter of me missing the labor Board hearing. I was 
somewhat stressed out, being in a money pinch and not wanting to be evicted 
from my apartment. I had found a job that helping [sic] me to meet my financial 
obligations and I didn’t want to loose [sic] it by missing work not knowing my 
chance at doing well at a hearing. When I given [sic] a chance to appeal the 
UIAB decision it seemed like a good thing to do because I didn’t feel as though 
the referee at unemployment saw all information presented to him quite right.
of the case, which were the sole grounds for this appeal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 
___________________________ 
Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.