Julio C. Gonzalez 
P.O. Box 427Georgetown, Delaware 19947 
Re: Julio C. Gonzalez v. Mountaire Farms & Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 
C.A. No. 02A-01-002
Date Submitted: June 13, 2002 
Date Decided: September 17, 2002 

Dear Mr. Gonzalez: 

This case comes before the Court on appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 
(the "Board"), which affirmed the Appeals Referee’s decision to deny Julio Gonzalez ("Claimant") 
unemployment compensation benefits. The Board’s decision is affirmed. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

This case stems from the employment relationship between Claimant and his employer, 
Mountaire Farms ("Employer"), located in Selbyville, Delaware. Claimant worked for Employer 
as a parts room clerk in the purchasing department. On July 2, 2002, a maintenance foreman 
discovered Claimant lying down, asleep, on a mat in the purchasing office. This area was connected 
to the parts room. Employer requested a meeting with all parties involved. Claimant arrived late 
to the first meeting and failed to appear at all for the second scheduled meeting. Employer fired 
Claimant on July 5, 2001. 

The Appeals Referee made the following findings of fact: 

This tribunal finds that on July 2, the third shift maintenance foreman found 
the claimant asleep in [sic] the job. It was after midnight and he heard the buzzer for 
the parts room going off. The foreman went to the room and saw one of his 
mechanics there. His mechanic indicated that he had been there for at least five 
minutes. The foreman pried open the window for the parts room and yelled for the 
claimant a couple of times, but got not [sic] response. He then crawled through the 
window and looked around the room. He did not see the claimant. He looked in one 
of the doors at the back of the parts room and saw the claimant lying on the floor 
asleep. The foreman got a security guard and together, they woke the claimant up. 
The claimant had felt sick. He did not go to see the nurse because he thought that she 
had left for the night. He also did not call his supervisor because he did not think that 
it was that bad. On prior occasions, the claimant had called or paged his supervisor 
when there had been a problem. 

The employer representative scheduled a meeting for July 3 with the claimant, 
the foreman, the claimant’s supervisor and the security guard. They waited until 7:50 
am, but the claimant did not show up. The employer representative then sent the 
other men home since they worked night shift. About five minutes later, the claimant 
showed up. He explained to the claimant the importance of being on time and he 
scheduled another meeting for July 5. On July 5, they waited until 8:00 am, but the 
claimant did not show up. On July 3, the claimant had left a letter admitting that he 
had been asleep on July 2. From this letter and the claimant not showing up for the 
meeting, the employer representative decided to discharge the claimant. 

After noting the undisputed fact of Claimant’s sleeping at work, the Referee concluded that 
Claimant violated his duty to Employer providing just cause for termination. Claimant appealed to 
the Board. 

After Claimant twice failed to appear at the specified place and time for his appeal hearing 
before the Board, a hearing was finally held on January 9, 2002. The Board adopted the Referee’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Additionally, the Board found "even if claimant felt ill, 
claimant’s actions in laying [sic] down and subsequently falling asleep on the job, rather than 
alerting a supervisor or fellow employee that he was ill, were willful or wanton." Claimant filed a 
pro se appeal with the Court. 

ISSUE PRESENTED

Essentially, Claimant challenges whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision.2 
Specifically, Claimant argues that he was not given a full opportunity to explain the circumstances 
surrounding the incident that led to the termination of his employment. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

In reviewing the decisions of the Board, this Court must determine whether the Board’s 
findings and conclusions are free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.3 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265 (Del. 1981); Ponchvatilla v. 
United States Postal Serv., Del. Super., C.A. No. 96A-06-19, Cooch, J. (June 9, 1997), Mem. Op. 
at 2; 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) ("In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the [Board] 
as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the 
jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to questions of law."). In looking for "substantial 
evidence," the Court is looking for "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion." Gorrell v. Division of Vocational Rehab. and Unemployment Ins. 
Appeal Bd., Del.Super., C.A. No. 96A-01-001, Graves, J. (July 31, 1996), Letter Op. at 4. Moreover, 
proscribed time frame and the letter was not submitted by counsel. 

"[i]t is not the appellate court's role to weigh the evidence, determine credibility questions or make 
its own factual findings, but merely to decide if the evidence is legally adequate to support the 
agency's factual findings." McManus v. Christina Service Co., Del. Super., C.A. No. 96A-06- 013, 
Silverman, J. (Jan. 31, 1997), Op. and Order at 4.4 

B. Dismissal for Just Cause 

Section 3315 of Title 19 of the Delaware Code provides, in relevant part: 

   An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: 
   
   (2) For the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual’s work 
   for just cause in connection with the individual’s work and for each week thereafter 
   until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not 
   consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 
   times the weekly benefit amount. 

In the case of Abex Corporation v. Todd, the Court defined an act constituting "just cause" 
for termination as "a wilful or wanton act in violation of either the employer’s interest, of the 
employee’s duties, or of the employee’s expected standard of conduct." 235 A.2d 271, 272 (Del. 
Super. 1967). One acts wilfully when he acts voluntarily, intentionally and deliberat ely. 
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Del. 1981). One must either be 
conscious of his conduct or recklessly indifferent of its consequences but the act "need not 
necessarily connote bad motive, ill design, or malice." Coleman v. Department of Labor, 288 A.2d 
285, 288 (Del. Super. 1972). 

Claimant admitted to Employer, the Appeals Referee, and the Board that he fell asleep during 
his shift. He further acknowledged that he did not attempt to contact the on-duty nurse or to report 
his alleged ailments to his supervisors. Claimant was not merely dozing at his desk; rather, the 
evidence shows that Claimant retired to another area and laid down on the floor to rest. "[A]s a 
general proposition, it cannot be seriously argued that claimant[’s] duties did not include remaining 
on the job during [his] regularly scheduled hours." Martin, 431 A.2d at 1267-68. The Board’s 
finding that Claimant’s actions gave rise to "just cause" for termination is supported by substantial 
evidence. 

CONCLUSION 

A review of the record satisfies the Court that the Board’s findin gs and decision are 
supported by substantial evidence and are free from legal error. Considering the foregoing, the 
decision of the Board denying unemployment benefits is affirmed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Very Truly Yours, 
Richard F. Stokes 
cc: Prothonotary’s Office 
Mountaire Farms