IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
JEFFERY W. EHRLICH, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) C.A. NO, 02A-10-009-FSS 
) 
HARRIS JEWELERS CO. and )
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE )
APPEAL BOARD, )
)
Appellees. )
Submitted: May 2, 2003 
Decided: August 26, 2003 

ORDER 

Upon Claimant’s Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board  

AFFIRMED 

Jeffery W. Ehrlich, 1105 Haines Avenue, Wilmington, Delaware, 19809. Pro Se 
Claimant/Appellant. 
Gary R. Spritz, Esquire, P.O. Box 7559, 2407 Raven Road, Wilmington, Delaware, 
19801. Attorney for Appellee, Harris Jewelers Company. 
Stephani J. Ballard, Esquire, Department of Justice, Carvel State Office Building, 
820 N. French Street, 6th Floor, Wilmington, Delaware, 19801. Deputy Attorney 
General for the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 
SILVERMAN, J. 

This is an employee’s appeal from the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeal Board’s denial of benefits. The Board found that the employee intentionally 
tried to misappropriate his employer’s money and, therefore, he engaged in willful 
misconduct justifying termination and disqualification from benefits. Employee 
offers several, alternative grounds for appeal. Basically, he alleges that the 
employer’s representative’s testimony was inconsistent, that the Board relied on 
inadmissable and unreliable evidence, and the Board may have had an ex parte 
conversation with the employer’s representative, which "may have swayed the 
decision." 

Procedurally, after the employee was fired on July 1, 2002 he applied 
for benefits, which a Division of Unemployment Insurance Appeals claims deputy 
denied on July 12, 2002. The employee appealed that decision and, after a hearing 
on August 28, 2002, an appeals referee reversed the claims deputy, holding that the 
employee was discharged without cause. The employer appealed that decision and, 
finally, the Board held a full hearing on September 25, 2002. Reversing the appeals 
deputy, the Board denied benefits. The employee filed a timely appeal to this 
court. The standard for review is well-settled. Unlike the administrative 
proceedings just mentioned, the appeal to this court is on the record. That means 
the review here is strictly limited. The court has no authority, on appeal, to decide 
which witnesses were more believable, much less to make independent findings of 
fact.1 On appeal, the court has two duties: First, the court must determine whether 
the Board’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Substantial 
evidence means evidence that has substance to it. In other words, the evidence has 
enough probative value that, when it is viewed in a reasonable light favorable to the 
Board’s findings, the Board’s findings are rational. The court’s second duty on 
appeal is to decide whether the Board correctly applied the law to the facts, as the 
Board found the facts to be. Again, the court has no authority on appeal to make its 
own factual findings and to redecide the case as it sees fit. 

The case’s basic facts are undisputed. Ehrlich was employed for 
seventeen years by Harris Jewelers as a salesman. On June 29, 2002 Ehrlich sold a 
tennis bracelet for $350. As it happened, the customer once worked for Harris 
Jewelers. The customer’s suspicions about the transaction were raised when Ehrlich 
offered to sell the bracelet for $350. The customer knew from his former employment 
that Ehrlich’s asking price was only $50 above the store’s cost. Furthermore, Ehrlich 
insisted on cash. The customer even offered to pay by check or debit card, but 
Ehrlich insisted on currency. Not only that, Ehrlich conducted the transaction away 
from the cash register. As explained at the hearing, for certain reasons sales usually 
happened near the cash register. 

The sale took place on a Saturday. By Monday, the customer was 
concerned enough that he spoke to the store’s manager, who began making inquires. 
The manager testified that he spoke with Ehrlich, and Ehrlich’s story did not matchup. 
Both the appeals referee’s and the Board’s decisions set out several 
inconsistencies. For example, Ehrlich’s paperwork reflected the sale of a $50 rope 
chain, not a $350 tennis bracelet. And when the transaction became an issue, Ehrlich 
produced the $300 difference, but the cash was in different denominations from the 
money paid by the customer. The Board’s decision reflects other suspicious evidence 
found in the record. Ehrlich tried to explain what happened. For example, he 
testified that he put the cash in the "layaway drawer," and several people had access 
to it. 

In finding for Ehrlich, the appeals referee focused on the fact that in the 
end, Ehrlich accounted for the full price he charged for the tennis bracelet, $350. 
Also, the jewelry store did not have written procedures for handling cash. 
Accordi ngly, the appeals referee concluded that the way Ehrlich handled the 
transaction did not amount to willful misconduct. 

The Board, however, after hearing Ehrlich’s, the manager’s, the 
customer’s and other witness’s testimony concluded that the way Ehrlich handled the 
transaction "lead to the conclusion that claimant was intentionally trying to 
misappropriate money from employer." In reaching that conclusion, the Board 
specifically accepted the testimony of the manager and the customer over that of the 
employee. As explained above, deciding which witnesses are believable is a matter 
for the fact-finder, the Board. 

The Board’s decision spells out the Board’s conclusions and the 
evidence on which they are based. While the employee testified on his behalf, the 
Board rejected his explanations and it accepted the employer’s and the customer’s 
version, and their implications. The court is not allowed to reevaluate the testimony 
and weigh it differently. The Board’s findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence, and they must stand. Once the Board concluded from the evidence that, as 
a matter of fact, the employee was trying to misappropriate the employer’s receipts, 
the Board was justified in concluding that the employee engaged in willful 
misconduct. And, as a matter of law, willful misconduct justifies denial of 
unemployment insurance benefits. 

As to the employee’s final claim on appeal, that the manager asked to 
speak to someone after the hearing "regarding Mr. Ehrlich," the basis for that claim 
is a matter of record. According to the transcript of the Board’s hearing, near its 
conclusion the manager asked to speak to "somebody outside of this room about this 
. . . ." In response, a Board member said, "Ok, but it has nothing to do with the 
termination." The manager replied, "No." And the Board member then said, "Our 
only job is the termination." At that point, the employee changed the subject and 
there is nothing else in the record about any ex parte communication. Based on that 
exchange, the employee "feels that [the manager’s] request as well as any discussion 
that may have been held between [the manager] and any member of the . . . Board 
may have swayed the decision." There is no evidence that any improper 
communication actually took place between any Board member and the employer. 
Otherwise, as discussed above, the Board’s decision appears to be based entirely on 
the evidence and reasonable inferences, which amply support the Board’s wellexplained 
decision. 

In conclusion, after carefully reviewing the Board’s decision and the 
record, it appears that the Board’s fact-finding was based on substantial evidence and 
it is free from legal error. Accordingly, the Board’s September 25, 2002 decision, 
which became final on October 17, 2002, is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 
_________________________________ 
Judge 
oc: Prothonotary