IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY 
IRIS JOYCE DOBNACK, )
)
Claimant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 02A-04-13 JRS 
) 
COLONIAL SECURITY SERVICE, ) 
) 
Employer-Appellee, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ) 
APPEAL BOARD, ) 
)
Appellee. )
Submitted: October 24, 2002 
Decided: January 23, 2003 

O R D E R 

This 23rd day of January, 2003, upon consideration of the pro se appeal of Iris 
Joyce Dobnack ("Ms. Dobnack") from the decision of the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeal Board (the "Board"), dated April 10, 2002, rejecting her application for 
benefits, the Appellant’s brief and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 

1. Colonial Security Service ("Colonial Security") employed Ms. Dobnack 
from April 2001 to December 2001 as a security guard at Brandywine Park 
Condominiums. On December 24, 2001, Charles Grimes ("Mr. Grimes") announced 
that Tamatha Burress would replace him as the new supervisor at the Brandywine 
Park Condominiums and that there might be some changes in the employee schedules. 
The parties disagree on Ms. Dobnack’s response to this announcement. Colonial 
Security presented witnesses who stated that Ms. Dobnack complained loudly and 
used profanity. Ms. Dobnack denies being loud and abusive, but she admits that she 
was "mad" when Mr. Grimes told her that her hours would be reduced. Both parties 
agree that Ms. Dobnack voluntarily left the job site without authorization before the 
end of her shift. 

2. According to a representative of Colonial Security, Ken Farrell ("Mr. 
Farrell"), and Colonial Security’s disciplinary report, Ms. Dobnack was terminated 
for insubordination, leaving her post without authorization, and abusive language and 
behavior, effective as of December 24th. Approximately a week later, she contacted 
Samuel Chickadel ("Mr. Chickadel"), the Vice President of Colonial Security, who 
indicated to Ms. Dobnack that he might be able to offer some weekend work to her. 
Ms. Dobnack continued to communicate with Colonial Security, but she was never 
re-hired in any capacity. 

3. Ms. Dobnack filed a request for benefits with the Delaware Department of 
Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance on January 6, 2002. The Claims 
Deputy denied her request under Title 19, Section 3315(2) of the Delaware Code,2 
finding that Ms. Dobnack "was terminated for insubordination, profanity, and leaving 
her post."3 The Claims Deputy concluded that "the employer had just cause to 
terminate the claimant." Ms. Dobnack appealed the Deputy’s findings. In the 
hearing before the Appeals Referee, Colonial Security did not present any witnesses 
to the incident on December 24th. Accordingly, the Referee accepted Ms. 
Dobnack’s testimony and granted Ms. Dobnack’s request for benefits. Colonial 
Security then appealed to the Board. At this hearing, Colonial Security offered the 
testimony of three witnesses to the events of December 24th. To rebut this evidence, 

Ms. Dobnack testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of her exhusband, 
John Dobnack. The Board found Colonial Security’s witnesses more 
persuasive and reversed the Referee’s decision granting benefits. The Board 
concluded that the "claimant’s behavior rose to the level of willful or wanton conduct 
and provided the employer with just cause for claimant’s discharge." 

4. In the current appeal, Ms. Dobnack disputes the Board’s finding that she 
was discharged for "just cause."6 Instead, she contends that she quit her job and that 
she had just cause to do so. Specifically, she argues that she was justified in leaving 
her job when she was advised that her work hours would be substantially reduced by 
the new management. She also contends that the Board’s decision was based solely 
upon hearsay. And she questions the absence of certain witnesses from the hearing. 

5. The role of the Court when reviewing an appeal from the Board is well 
settled. The Court reviews the Board’s decision to determine whether its factual 
findings are supported by substantial evidence and reviews its ultimate decision to 
ensure that it is free from legal error. Substantial evidence has been defined as 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as an adequate basis to support 
a conclusion. Substantial evidence requires "more than a scintilla but less than a 
preponderance" of evidence to support the finding. The Court does not weigh 
evidence, assess credibility, or make independent factual findings. The Board’s 
findings in these evidentiary matters are considered conclusive. 

6. As a part of its findings, the Board adopted the Referee’s conclusion that 
Ms. Dobnack was terminated (as opposed to voluntarily separating from her 
employer) and that Section 3315(2) governs Ms. Dobnack’s case. Under Section 
3315(2), an employee is not qualified to receive benefits "[f]or the week in which the 
individual was discharged from his work for just cause in connection with the 
individu al’s work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed 
in each of 4 subsequent weeks." "Just cause" is defined as a "wilful or wanton act 
in violation of either the employer’s interest, or of the employee’s duties, or of the 
expected standard of conduct." The employer has the burden to prove that the 
employee was discharged for "just cause" by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Alternatively, if the Board had found that Ms. Dobnack quit her job, the Board would 
have applied Section 3315(1), which only allows the claimant to recover benefits if 
she carries the burden of proving that she voluntarily terminated her employment for 
"good cause." "Good cause" is a reason that "would justify one in voluntarily 
leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed." Some 
examples of "good cause" to quit include nonpayment of wages, a substantial 
reduction in wages or hours, or a substantial deviation from the original terms of 
employment.

7. The Board’s factual finding that Ms. Dobnack was terminated is supported 
by substantial evidence. The Board accepted Colonial Security’s version of the facts 
as true. Mr. Farrell asserted that Ms. Dobnack was discharged for insubordination, 
leaving the work site, and abusive language. Her termination was documented in a 
disciplinary action report, which was entered as an exhibit in the Referee’s hearing. 
The Court concludes that the substantial evidence in the record supports the Board’s 
finding that Ms. Dobnack was discharged.

8. Three witnesses at the scene of the December 24th incident described Ms. 
Dobnack’s outburst and subsequent exit from the workplace. Ms. Dobnack herself 
admits to being "mad" for having her hours reduced and to leaving the job site 
without express permission from Mr. Grimes. This testimony is more than adequate 
to support the Board’s finding that Ms. Dobnack reacted in a loud and abusive 
manner to Mr. Grimes’ announcement of the new supervisor and left her post without 
permission. 

9. Delaware courts consider the use of obscenity without provocation to be 
wilful and wanton misconduct, establishing "just cause" for termination. And a 
single instance of misconduct is sufficient to establish "just cause."  The substantial 
evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Mr. Grimes did not provoke Ms. 
Dobnack in any manner. Therefore, by presenting testimony of Ms. Dobnack’s 
unprovoked outburst, Colonial Security has met its burden to demonstrate that Ms. 
Dobnack was fired for "just cause." 

10. Ms. Dobnack’s last two arguments may be summarily rejected. She first 
claims that the Board based its decision on hearsay. Under Delaware law, the Board 
may not base its decision solely on hearsay; hearsay evidence is permissible if it 
accompanies other probative evidence sufficient to support the finding.21 Here, the 
Board did not rely solely upon hearsay; it also relied upon the direct testimony of 
Colonial Security’s three witnesses to derive the facts necessary to reach its decision. 
In addition, Ms. Dobnack questions the absence of Jack Monaco, a representative of 
Brandywine Park Condominiums, and other alleged witnesses to the December 24th 
incident, from the hearings before the Board and the Referee. In hearings before the 
Board and the Referee, each party may present their case as they choose. To prevail, 
the parties must meet the evidentiary standards articulated in Section 3315(2) and any 
other applicable sections of the Delaware Code. Neither party is required to present 
certain witnesses or certain evidence. The absence of a witness or witnesses from the 
hearings, by itself, is not a basis to question to the Board’s findings. 

11. Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Board denying Ms. 
Dobnack’s benefits is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Judge Joseph R. Slights, III 
Original to Prothonotary 
cc: Iris Joyce Dobnack 
Joseph J. Longobardi, III, Esquire 
Stephani J. Ballard, Esquire