IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
JONATHAN CHURCH, ) 
Employer - Appellant ) 
) 
v. ) C.A. No. 02A-10-010 WCC 
) 
STEPHANIE FERGUSON, ) 
Employee ) 
and ) 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ) 
APPEAL BOARD ) 
) 
Appellees. ) 
Submitted: October 1, 2003 
Decided: December 23, 2003 

ORDER 

Appeal from Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. DENIED. 
Jonathan Church, 168 Ramunno Circle, Hockessin, DE 19707. Pro se. 
Stephanie Ferguson, 401 Brewster Drive, Newark, DE 19711. Pro se. 
Stephani Ballard, Esquire, Department of Justice, 800 N. French Street, 
Wilmington, DE 19801. Attorney for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 
CARPENTER, J. 

This 23rd day of December, 2003, after consideration of the appeal of 
Jonathan Church ("Appellant") from the August 21, 2002 decision of the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") and upon review of the briefs 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 

1. Appellant employed Stephanie Ferguson ("Appellee") as a babysitter for 
his children from June 2001 until May 16, 2002. Appellee worked part-time during 
the school year, while Appellee attended college full-time and full-time during the 
summer months. She received $8.00 an hour. While the specific date is in dispute, 
around the end of April or the beginning of May 2002, Appellee approached 
Appellant and requested a raise. Appellee explained that she had another job offer 
that paid $9.00 an hour and she wanted a raise in exchange for continued 
employment with Appellant. In response, Appellant told her that he wanted to 
create a job description for the position, as the duties had changed, and he wanted 
to evaluate her performance when she reached one year of employment with him. 
Appellant later explained that he would not give Appellee a raise. Thereafter, 
Appellee became separated from her employment with Appellant and the facts 
surrounding how this occurred are at issue in this dispute. 

2. On May 19, 2002, Appellee filed for unemploym ent benefits. In a May 
31, 2002 decision, the Claims Deputy from the Department of Labor granted 
Appellee benefits for the week of May 25, 2002 because Appellee was not 
permitted to work out her two week notice, but as of June 1, 2002, the Claims 
Deputy disqualified Appellee from the receipt of benefits. The Claims Deputy 
found that the Appellee voluntarily left her employment without good cause. 

3. Thereafter, the Appellee appealed the Claims Deputy’s decision to an 
Appeals Referee. The Appeals Referee presided over a hearing on July 8, 2002, 
where both Appellee and Appellant testified and were unrepresented. The Referee 
found a direct conflict surrounding the events that occurred between Appellant and 
Appellee, but since several inconsistencies existed in Appellee’s explanation of the 
meetings with Appellant, found the Appellant to be more credible. The Referee 
affirmed the decision of the Claims Deputy and found that Appellee left her work 
voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work.4 The Referee explained 
that "[m]ere dissatisfaction with one’s hourly wage certainly does not meet the good 
cause criteria" of § 3315(1).5 The Referee found that Appellee’s reasons for leaving 
her employment were personal ones and therefore were not attributable to her 
employment with the Appellant. 

4. Subsequently, Appellee appealed to the Board and on August 21, 2002, 
the Board held a hearing. However, Appellant, Mr. Church, did not attend this 
hearing. The Board found Appellee’s testimony to be credible that she was 
terminated from her employment on May 19, 2002. As a result, the Board reversed 
the decision of the Referee. The Board found that Appellee’s testimony was 
supported by evidence that Appellant placed a job advertisement to fill Appellee’s 
position on May 15, 2002. This occurred shortly after Appellee requested a raise. 
The Board explained that "[i]n a discharge case, the burden of proof is on the 
employer to show that claimant engaged in some sort of willful or wanton conduct 
which would justify her discharge and disqualification from benefits." The Board 
found that Appellee’s request for a raise was not willful or wonton conduct and that 
there was no evidence of any other misconduct on the part of Appellee. As a result, 
the Board found that Appellee was discharged from her employment without just 
cause and is therefore entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. 

Consequently, Appellant requested on August 29, 2002 that the Board grant him a 
rehearing. Appellant’s application for reconsideration before the Board was denied. 
The Board explained that while Appellant was properly notified of the date, time 
and place of the hearing, he chose not to attend for personal reasons connected with 
his business. The Board further explained that Appellant’s testimony and evidence 
from the hearing before the Referee was part of the record considered by the Board. 
Appellant now appeals the Board’s decision to this Court pursuant to title 10, 
section 3323 of the Delaware Code. 

5. The function of this Court on review of an Unemployment Insurance 
Appeal Board decision is to determine whether the decision is supported by 
substantial evidence and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence is such 
relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of 
credibility, or make factual findings in the first instance. Rather, this Court’s role 
is to determine whether the evidence is legally adequate to support the Board’s 
findings. 

6. In this appeal, the Appellant attempts to present his version of the facts, 
which are dissimilar from the facts presented by the Appellee at the Board hearing. 
The crux of the Appellant’s argument is that the Appellee voluntarily left her 
employment with the Appellant. This is a factual dispute that was within the 
province of the Board to decide. The role of this Court is to merely review the 
Board’s decision, as this Court does not weigh evidence, determine credibility or 
make factual findings. The Appellant had an opportunity to present his version of 
the facts at the hearing before the Board on August 21, 2002, but unfortunately, he 
missed this opportunity. This appeal does not afford the Appellant an opportunity 
to re-litigate his case because this Court will not disturb the Board’s decision absent 
legal error or a decision unsupported by substantial evidence. 

7. In order for a disqualification of unemployment compensation benefits, 
an employer must establish "just cause." To establish "just cause," an employer 
must demonstrate "a willful or wanton act in violation of either the employer’s 
interests, or of the employee’s duties, or of the employee’s expected standard of 
conduct." The Board found that the evidence was sufficient to show that 
Appellee’s behavior did not rise to the level of willful or wanton conduct. It is clear 
that the Appellant’s placing of an advertisement to obtain someone to replace the 
Appellee before terminating her was a key factor in the Board’s decision. This 
provided objective evidence beyond the pointing of fingers by the parties on which 
the Board could fairly rely and this evidence reasonably reflected an intent by the 
Appellant to terminate the Appellee. While the Board may have viewed this 
evidence in a different light if addressed by the Appellant, it was not afforded that 
opportunity due to the Appellant’s absence from the hearing. Based upon the 
limited record before the Board, the Court must agree that there was sufficient, 
substantial evidence present to support such a finding and that the Board’s decision 
was free from legal error.
 
8. The Court finds the Board’s decision in this matter to be factually and 
legally supported by the evidence presented. The Board’s decision is therefore
AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.