IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY 
CALDWELL STAFFING SERVICES, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) CA No. 02A-07-002-JEB 
) 
NARINDRA V. RAMRATTAN, ) 
and UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ) 
APPEAL BOARD, ) 
)
Appellees . )
Submitted: January 9, 2003 
Decided: January 29, 2003 
Upon Appeal From the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 
Reversed and Remanded. 
OPINION 
Appearances: 
Robert F. Stewart, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware. 
Attorney for Appellant. 
Narindra V. Ramrattan, 1316 Choptank Road, Middletown, Delaware, 19709 
Pro Se Appellee 
Stephanie Ballard, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware.
Attorney for Appellee Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
JOHN E. BABIARZ, JR., JUDGE. 

This is the Court’s opinion on an appeal filed by Caldwell Staffing Services 
(Employer) from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (Board) 
granting unemployment benefits to Narindra Ramrattan (Claimant). Claimant has not 
participated in the appellate process, but the Board opposes the appeal and has filed 
papers accordingly.1 For the reasons explained below, the decision of the Board is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Board for a new hearing. 

FACTS 

Ramrattan worked as a converter cleaner for one of Caldwell’s clients, 
Comcast Cable, sporadically from November 2001 through February 2002. On 
Friday, February 22, 2002, Nikki Waller, Ramrattan’s supervisor at Comcast, 
indicated on Ramrattan’s weekly time sheet that the assignment was over. Ramrattan 
did not report to Comcast on Monday, and the parties disagree as to whether or not 
Ramrattan called Caldwell to report that he was available for another assignment. He 
was terminated from his position shortly thereafter and applied to the Department of 
Labor for unemployment b enefits. A claims deputy awarded him benefits, and 
Caldwell appealed. An appeals referee held a hearing where the parties were 
permitted to question each other. The referee affirmed the claims deputy, and 
Employer appealed to the Board. 

At the hearing, Jim Randall, president of Caldwell Staffing, introduced Nikki 
Waller, Ramrattan’s supervisor at Comcast, but counsel for the Board stated, "You 
can’t ask her questions. She’s just got to testify."2 Waller testified that she had 
marked Ramrattan’s time sheet that his job was over, but that she had later told him 
to return to work on Monday. She never changed the time sheet. Ramrattan testified 
that he did not return to work because the time sheet indicated that there was no more 
work and that Waller had never told him otherwise. 

The Board affirmed the referee’s conclusion that Ramrattan was discharged 
without just cause and was therefore entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. 
The Board found Waller not to be a credible witness because she was unsure of what 
she said to Ramrattan and when she said it. Noting that Ramrattan’s official time 
sheet for the week ending February 23, 2002, stated that the Comcast assignment was 
over, the Board concluded that Ramrattan did not commit misconduct in not reporting 
to Comcast on the following Monday. Finally, the Board affirmed the referee’s 
finding that Employer failed to prove that Ramrattan had failed to call Caldwell on 
Monday morning, as required.3 Employer filed a timely appeal, to which Ramrattan 
has not responded but which the Board opposes. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The function of this Court on review of a Board decision is to determine 
whether the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. This Court does 
not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make factual findings. 
When the Board’s factual findings are supported by the record, the jurisdiction of the 
Court is confined to questions of law. 

DISCUSSION 

Employer argues first that the Board violated its due process rights by not 
allowing its president, James Randall, to question the witnesses. The Board argues 
in response that (1) Randall voiced no objection at the time and therefore Employer 
cannot raise the issue on appeal; (2) the Boardhas no discretion to allow the 
unauthorized practice of law; (3) there is no due process right for a non-attorney to 
question witnesses at the administrative level; and (4) the Board’s rules require that 
an employer who wants representation must do so through an attorney. As to the 
Board’s first argument, the Court will consider the issue of Randall’s role at the 
hearing, even though he did not object to counsel’s directive, because Delaware 
courts generally give pro se litigants a certain leeway not afforded to licensed 
attorneys. 

Pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 19 sec. 3321(a), the Board may promulgate its 
own regulations for the conduct of hearings, and they need not conform to common 
law or statutory rules of evidence or other technical rules of procedure. However, the 
guarantee of due process trumps all else. While the Board may relax certain rules of 
procedure, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that even at the administrative 
level "it is fundamental that the right to confront witnesses, to cross-examine them, 
to refute them, and to have a record of their testimony must be accorded unless 
waived." Thus, an employer appearing before the Board has due process rights that 
can not be abated. Several Department of Labor rules address this issue. 

Employer relies on Code of Delaware Regulations 65 600 020(4)(a) 
("Regulation 20"), which provides for appeals to the "Appeals Tribunals or to the 
Commission," the predecessor of the current Unemployment Insurance Appeal 
Board.9 Regulation 20 provides in part that "[a]ny corporation or association may be 
represented by an officer or by a duly authorized representative." In this case, 
Caldwell Staffing is clearly a business entity, but its precise nature is not apparent 
from the record. Employer argues that Regulation 20 explicitly permits an officer 
such as Jim Randall to represent its interests before the Board. The Board argues that 
Regulation 20 is part of a group of regulations promulgated by the Delaware 
Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance, which is different from 
the statutorily created Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.10 

The Board relies instead on its own Rule F, which provides as follows: "An 
employer, if he desires representation, may be represented by an attorney-at-law duly 
admitted to practice in the State of Delaware."11 Despite the permissive "may be 
represented," the Board argues that an employer seeking representation before the 
Board can do so only through an attorney.12 Employer does not assert that it was 
unaware of this option; it merely chose not to take it. 

The Court would construe the decision not to obtain counsel as a waiver of the 
right to confront witnesses were it not for Board Rule B. This Rule establishes a 
hybrid system where Board members and parties both take an active role in the 
hearing process: 

   The Board of Appeals shall have the power to call, examine and crossexamine 
   a witness and to request documentary evidence be admitted into 
   the record. All parties to the hearing shall be given the opportunity 
   to cross-examine witnesses, introduce documents and inspect 
   documents.

While the Board is the primary questioner and sole fact finder, this rule 
envisions participation in the hearing by both Board members and parties. The 
description of the parties’ role is not limited to pro se claimants (as opposed to 
employers), nor is there any restriction imposed on artificial entities. In this case, the 
transcript shows that the Board failed to follow its own rules.14 Under these facts, 
where Employer believed it could represent itself and was, in fact, permitted to do so 
by Board Rule B, the Court concludes that the Board violated Employer’s right to due 
process when it disallowed any questioning by the parties. 

Despite the clear provisions of Board Rule B, the Board argues that allowing 
Randall to question or cross-examine witnesses would have constituted the 
unauthorized practice of law. The admission of attorneys to the practice of law and 
the exclusion of unauthorized persons from practice lie within the exclusive province 
of the Delaware Supreme Court. Although the Court has held that a corporation can 
be represe nted before a court only by a licensed attorney, the Court has not ruled on 
whether a non-attorney employee may represent an employer at the administrative 
level. The Board points to dicta from the Delaware State Bar Ass’n v. Alexander for 
the proposition that only a licensed attorney may practice before an administrative 
body.17 In Alexander, the Court quoted case law from numerous jurisdictions, 
including a 1946 New Jersey case which states that "[t]he exercise of such 
professional skill certainly includes the pursuit, as an advocate for another, of a 
legal remedy within the jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial tribunal."18 This clause refers 
to an individual representing the interests of "another," not to the representation of 
an employer by one of its own officers or employees. 

The Superior Court has addressed this issue on several occasions. In Brainard 
v. Chrysler Corp., this Court held that a non-attorney employee of an employer may 
represent the employer before the Board based on the previously cited Regulation 
20.19 Four years later, in Marshall-Steele v. Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, this Court 
held that a non-employee, non-attorney hired by the employer solely for purposes of 
representation could not represent that employer before the Industrial Accident Board 
because such conduct would constitute unauthorized practice of law.20 The Marshall-
Steele Court explicitly distinguished between the representation of a non-attorney 
employee and that of a non-attorney non-employee, as in Brainard. This Court has 
also stated that "[t]hough corporations must be represented by an attorney in court 
proceedings, a non-attorney employee may represent the employer at an 
administrative hearing."21 The Court finds these cases to be persuasive. 

The Court further finds that unless and until the Board changes its rules, parties 
who appear before the Board may cross-examine witnesses and produce and examine 
documents, as provided for in Board Rule B. In the case at bar, Employer’s belief 
that its officer could question witnesses was supported by the Board’s rules, which 
the Board failed to follow. In disallowing cross-examination of witnesses despite the 
provisions of Rule B, the Board violated Employer’s right to due process, which 
extends to quasi-judicial proceedings. For all these reasons, the Board’s decision is 
reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to the Board to conduct a new 
hearing. 

In so ordering, the Court is not authorizing business officers or employees to 
practice law before the Board, but is ordering the Board to inform parties that they 
may either hire an attorney for full representation or elect to "cross-examine 
witnesses, introduce documents and inspect documents" themselves, as set forth in 
Board Rule B. Nor is the Court suggesting in any way that parties may usurp the 
Board’s role as the primary interrogator. As Board Rule B provides, "[t]he Board 
shall inquire fully into the facts of the particular case and shall consider the issues 
expressly ruled upon in the decision from which the appeal was filed The Board 
of Appeals shall have the power to call, examine and cross-examine a witness and to 
request documentary evidence be admitted into the record." 

The Court notes with interest that at the hearing before the appeals referee, the 
parties were given ample opportunity to question each other. If there are rules for the 
referee to follow, they are not part of the record in this case, and the pertinent statute 
requires only that the referee conduct a "fair hearing."22 Common sense suggests that 
hearings before the appeals referee and the Board should follow similar procedures. 

Until this odd discrepancy creates a due process problem for a litigant who appeals 
to this Court, this is a matter for the Division of Unemployment to address. 
Having found as a matter of law that the Board violated Employer’s right to 
due process, the Court need not reach the other issues raised on appeal. 

CONCLUSION 

For all the reasons discussed above, the Board’s decision granting 
unemployment insurance benefits to Claimant Narindra Ramrattan is Reversed, and 
the cause is Remanded to the Board for a new hearing consistent with this Opinion. 
It Is So ORDERED. 

Judge John E. Babiarz, Jr.