IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY
JANICE M. BRIDDELL ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
DART FIRST STATE ) C. A. No. 01A-06-008 
) 
and ) 
) 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ) 
APPEAL BOARD ) 
) 
Appellees. ) 
Submitted: December 4, 2001 
Decided: March 28, 2002 
Janice M. Briddell, pro se 
James J. Hanley, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, DE 19801 
Upon Consideration of Appellant’s Appeal From 
Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 
AFFIRMED 
VAUGHN, Resident Judge 

Briddell v. DART First State and Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 
C.A. No. 01A-06-008 JTVMarch 28, 2002 

ORDER 

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record of the case, it appears 
that: 

1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal 
Board ("UIAB" or "the Board"), which denied the claimant’s application for 
unemployment benefits. Janice M. Briddell had been a bus driver for Delaware 
Transit Corporation, known as DART First State, since March 20, 1994. It is 
undisputed that in March 2000 she became physically disabled and was not able to 
perform her job as a bus driver. Medical records which are in the record list her 
condition as cervical spondylosis, cervical facet dys., occipital H/A. Under the terms 
and conditions of her employment she was placed on short term medical disability, 
and her job was held open for two years in case she was able to return to work during 
that period. On March 18, 2001, she filed for unemployment benefits. A claims 
deputy found that she was disqualified from benefits because her unemployment was 
caused by her disability which prevented her from working. The appeals referee and 
the UIAB agreed with that determination. Ms. Briddell then filed this appeal. 
2. The statutory basis for the Board’s denial of benefits is 19 Del. C. § 
3315(8), which provides that a claimant is disqualified from benefits under the 
following circumstances: 

   If it shall be determined by the Department that total or 
   partial unemployment is due to the individual’s inability to 
   work. Such disqualification to terminate when the 
   individual becomes able to work and available for work as 
   determined by a doctor’s certificate and meets all other 
   requirements under this title. 

This section is consistent with 19 Del. C. § 3314(3), which provides that a claimant 
is eligible to receive benefits if the claimant "[i]s able to work and is available for 
work and is actively seeking work," and with 19 Del. C. 3315(1) which provides that, 
if an individual leaves work involuntarily due to illness, "no disqualification shall 
prevail after the individual becomes able to work and available for work ... but the 
Department shall require a doctor’s certificate to establish such availability." 

3. An individual seeking unemployment benefits is "available for work" only 
to the extent that "she is willing, able and ready to accept employment which she has 
no good cause to refuse, that is, she is genuinely attached to the labor market."1 
"Available for work" has been further explained as follows: 
The determination of ‘availability’ for unemployment 
compensation purposes is a subjective one [in the sense 
that] the ability of a particular employee to secure work 
must be measured by the skill of that employee in an 
identifiable labor market. 

As so defined, the term ‘availability for employment’ 
incorporates both the requirement of ability to work and 
qualification through skill, training or experience for a 
particular occupation, commonly expressed in terms of ‘an 
identifiable labor market.’ 

A labor market for a person exists when the kind of work which a claimant is able to 
perform is generally performed in the area where he or she is seeking employment.4 
It is not required that the claimant be available for his or her usual type of work. 5 
Availability for work in another type of employment is sufficient. 

4. In reviewing the decisions of the UIAB, this Court must determine whether 
the findings and conclusions of the Board are free from legal error and supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.6 The function of the reviewing Court is to 
determine whether the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.7 
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.8 The appellate court does not weigh the 
evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings.9 It 
merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency’s factual 
findings.10 It also determines if the Board made any errors of law. 

5. Ms. Briddell has offered the Court documents which are not part of the 
record below. Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 72(g), however, consideration 
of the appeal is confined to the record of the proceedings below. 

6. As mentioned, it appears not to be disputed that when the claimant left work 
in March 2000, she did so because her disability prevented her from working. She 
contends, however, that her condition has improved and that she is now able to work 
and available for work and, therefore, has become eligible for benefits. She contends 
that the Board erred by concluding otherwise. 

7. The controversy centers on two disability statements from Mid-Atlantic Pain 
Institute, P.A., one dated March 2, 2001 and one dated May 3, 2001. The March 2, 
2001disability statement stated that the claimant was partially disabled. It appears 
that all of her disability statements for periods prior to March 2, 2001 stated that she 
was totally disabled. The March 2 statement, therefore, indicated a change in her 
condition. It stated that Ms. Briddell could work eight hours per day subject to 
restrictions. It contains a number of preprinted restrictions with a box opposite each. 
Boxes were checked indicating that Ms. Briddell’s restrictions were "no prolonged 
standing/walking, no prolonged sitting, no lifting over ten pounds, no overhead work, 
no squatting, crawling, kneeling or stooping, no repetitive bending and twisting." To 
the right of no prolonged standing, walking or sitting, is the notation "to tolerance." 
Under "other," there was a handwritten notation of "no repetitive pushing or pulling," 
plus another restriction which is not fully legible but appears to be no working above 
the head. Finally, under comments, the form states "sedentary work." The appeals 
referee had this disability statement when he conducted his hearing on May 2, 2001. 

At that hearing the claimant testified that she had just seen her doctor the previous 
Thursday, April 26, and that her doctor told her she could return to work. The 
appeals referee invited her to obtain an updated disability statement from that visit 
and submit it for his consideration. Ms. Briddell did, in fact, obtain an updated 
statement dated May 3, 2001, which she submitted to the Department of Labor on or 
about May 7. The appeals referee’s decision was issued May 10. He concluded that 
the claimant’s ability to work was "severely restricted" and that she "has not been 
able to work or available for work." 

8. Ms. Briddell argues to this Court that the appeals referee did not consider 
the May 3 disability statement. That may be true. His decision makes no mention of 
it. He was aware from her testimony that her last visit to Mid-Atlantic Pain Institute 
had been April 26, and only the March 2 disability statement is referred to in his 
decision. However, the May 3 statement was considered by the Board. It was filled 
out by a different representative of Mid-Atlantic Pain Institute than the one who filled 
out the March 2 statement. It was the same as the March 2 statement in that it stated 
that the claimant was partially disabled and able to work 8 hours a day, subject to 
restrictions. It was different from the March 2 statement in that none of the boxes on 
the form were checked. However, along side "no prolonged standing/walking, no 
prolonged sitting," there was a handwritten notation that those activities were "as 
tolerated." Under comments, a handwritten notation limited the claimant’s activity 
to "sedentary, light duty work." After the Board listened to additional testimony from 
the claimant and considered the May 3 disability statement and the appeals referee’s 
decision, it adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the appeals referee 
and concluded that the "claimant is medically unable to work at her job with 
employer, given her restrictions." In its decision it stated that the claimant’s 
testimony verified that her restrictions were as stated in the May 3 disability 
statement, "previously considered by the Appeals Referee." 

9. The Board’s reference to the May 3 statement as having been previously 
considered by the appeals referee may not be correct; and, as discussed above, the 
claimant’s "availability for work" under unemployment compensation law is not 
limited to her availability to return to her specific job as a bus driver. However, I am 
not persuaded that these shortcomings in the Board’s written decision deprive it of 
a substantial evidentiary basis or render it legally incorrect. The Board did adopt the 
findings and conclusions of the appeals referee and it did conclude that the additional 
evidence it received was supportive of that decision. When one compares the March 
2 and May 3 disability statements, it is not at all clear that they were intended to 
express a materially different opinion on the claimant’s ability to work. Both limited 
her to "sedentary," or "sedentary, light duty work." Both indicated that her standing, 
walking and sitting were limited to "as tolerated." A showing that a person is ready 
for "sedentary, light duty" work "as tolerated" is not necessarily sufficient by itself 
to establish that the person is "available for work" for purposes of unemployment 
compensation. Any person whose standing, walking and sitting are restricted to a 
self-determined tolerance is of some questionable employability. There is nothing in 
the record in this case to suggest any particular type of work for which the claimant 
may be qualified with those restrictions. The burden is on the claimant to establish 
that she is entitled to unemployment benefits.11 After careful consideration, I have 
concluded that the Board’s decision that the claimant is not able to work or available 
for work is supported by substantial evidence and is free of legal error. 

7. Therefore, the decision of the UIAB is affirmed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 
s/s James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
Resident Judge 
oc: Prothonotary 
xc: James J. Hanley, Esq. 
Janice M. Briddell 
Order Distribution