IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY
TAMIRA D. BAKER, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) C.A. No. 02A-10-001 HDR 
) 
HOSPITAL BILLING & ) 
COLLECTION SERVICE, LTD. and )
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE )
APPEAL BOARD, )
)
Appellees. )
Submitted: January 15, 2003 
Decided: April 30, 2003 
Tamira D. Baker, Dover, Delaware, pro se. 
Jennifer C. Bebko Jauffret, Esq., Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellee Hospital Billing & Collection Service, Ltd. 
Stephani J. Ballard, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Appellee Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 
Upon Appeal from a Decision of the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 
DISMISSED 
RIDGELY, President Judge 

O R D E R 

This 30th day of April, 2003, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record below, it appears that: 

(1) Tamira D. Baker appeals from a decision of the Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board ("the Board" or "UIAB"), which concluded that Baker was 
disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits because she voluntarily 
terminated her employment with Hospital Billing & Collection Services, Ltd. 
("HBCS") without good cause attributable to her work. 

(2) Tamira D. Baker was employed by Hospital Billing & Collection 
Service, Ltd. from December 3, 2001 until March 14, 2002 as a part-time Patient 
Account Representative, Level I. 

(3) HBCS contends that Baker voluntarily terminated her employment, 
basing that contention on a letter that it claims was executed and signed by Baker 
stating that she was giving her two weeks notice of resignation and that her last day 
of work would be March 14, 2002. The entire letter was printed, including Baker’s 
name, which was printed at the bottom. Baker denies that she wrote the letter of 
resignation and alleges that the letter was forged by some unknown person within 
HBCS. 

(4) Baker’s supervisor, Terrell Eason, testified that Baker informed her that 
she was looking into a job with another company, which would either be full-time, 
or at least more hours than what she was working for HBCS. Following that 
statement, Eason claimed, Baker handed her the letter of resignation. HBCS 
presented evidence that Baker had been interested in obtaining a full-time position 
with HBCS, but that no such positions were available at the time. 

(5) According to Baker, she was approached by Eason in the parking lot of 
HBCS when she arrived for work on March 14, 2002. Baker contends that she was 
still in her car when Eason came out of the building and approached her, telling her 
that there was no work for her that day and that she would be contacted when work 
would again be available. Baker was not contacted by HBCS after that date. 

(6) On March 15, 2002, Annie Grillo of the Human Resources department 
at HBCS received the alleged letter of resignation. HBCS then processed the 
separation as a voluntary resignation by Baker. 

(7) On June 16, 2002, Baker filed a claim with the Department of Labor for 
unemployment benefits, alleging that she had been laid off due to lack of available 
work. A Department of Labor Claims Deputy found that Baker was qualified and 
eligible for benefits. 

(8) HBCS appealed the Claims Deputy’s finding and an evidentiary hearing 
was held before an Appeals Referee on August 13, 2002. Three witnesses appeared 
for HBCS and Baker appeared by telephone. On August 16, 2002, the Appeals 
Referee issued a decision finding that the letter of resignation did not appear to have 
been written by Baker and that she was laid off through no fault of her own and, 
therefore, entitled to unemployment benefits. 

(9) HBCS filed an appeal from the Appeals Referee’s decision to the Board 
on August 21, 2002. The Board duly notified the parties and scheduled a hearing on 
the matter for September 18, 2002. 

(10) Baker contacted the Board Secretary, Helen McClure, a number of times 
to inquire about the hearing and postponement of the hearing. McClure advised 
Baker to write a letter for postponement due to prior engagements. On September 9, 
2002, Baker faxed a letter to McClure requesting a postponement of the hearing due 
to job interviews and doctors’ appointments. The postponement request was denied 
by the Board Chairman. On September 10, 2002, McClure telephoned Baker to 
notify her that the Board did not grant her request for postponement. Baker alleges 
that McClure also advised her that it was not necessary for her to attend the hearing 
because she had won the first hearing which was being appealed and that she could 
call back for the decision after the hearing. Baker advised the Board that she would 
not appear at the hearing. Baker acknowledges that she knew that new evidence was 
likely to be presented at the hearing. 

(11) The Board convened on September 18, 2002 and held the hearing as 
scheduled. Baker did not appear at the hearing. Baker’s former supervisor, Terrell 
Eason, also did not appear. Annie Grillo and Michael Oneschuck appeared as 
representatives and testified for HBCS. The Board considered the evidence presented 
to the Appeals Referee and the new evidence. Following the hearing, the Board 
found that Baker had written and executed the letter of resignation and that Baker had 
voluntarily terminated her employment for personal reasons. The Board concluded 
she was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Baker appealed that 
decision to this Court. 

(12) Four issues have been raised on appeal to this Court. Baker now argues 
that the testimony of Grillo and Oneschuck was hearsay that cannot support the 
Board’s decision. Baker also argues that the Appeals Referee should have been 
obligated to attend the UIAB hearing to defend his prior decision to grant benefits. 
The Board submitted a brief on this appeal, raising the issue of whether Baker is 
entitled to dispute the Board’s decision after failing to appear at the Board hearing 
despite receiving proper and timely notice. HBCS raised the issue as to whether the 
Board properly concluded that Baker’s claim for unemployment benefits should be 
denied due to voluntary resignation without good cause attributable to her work. 

(13) The UIAB Rules and Regulations provide that "[a]ll parties to the appeal 
shall be present at the Board’s hearing. Failure to appear within 10 minutes of the 
time indicated on the Notice may result in the Board hearing the appeal in absence of 
the delinquent party " A party who does not appear at the hearing before the 
Board waives her right to participate in the hearing process. This Court has 
dismissed appeals from Board decisions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
when a claimant has failed to appear for the hearing and the Board dismissed the 
appeal. Because Baker has failed to exhaust the administrative process the appeal 
must be dismissed. 

(14) Even if the Court considers the merits of Baker’s appeal the Court finds 
no basis to reverse the decision below. Administrative boards are not constrained by 
the rigid evidentiary rules which govern jury trials, but should hear all evidence 
which could conceivably throw light on the controversy. Therefore, an informal 
tribunal, such as the UIAB, is not bound by the Delaware Rules of Evidence, but it 
may follow those rules in its discretion so long as a party is not unduly prejudiced. 
Hearsay evidence is generally admissible at administrative hearings for certain 
purposes. However, the admission of hearsay evidence does not determine the 
probative effect of the hearsay and the findings of an administrative body cannot rest 
alone on hearsay evidence. 

(15) Baker was not present for the hearing before the Board and, therefore, 
did not raise any objection with regard to the testimony before the Board as being 
unduly prejudicial, or even as to whether the testimony was in fact hearsay. Because 
such objections were not raised below, those arguments are waived and cannot be 
properly raised on appeal. 

(16) A judicial officer has no cognizable interest in seeking to have his 
rulings or legal interpretations sustained. This extends to an Appeals Referee for the 
Department of Labor. Therefore, the Appeals Referee, the fact-finder at the prior 
hearing, was not obligated to appear before the Board to defend his decision below. 

(17) Delaware’s unemployment compensation statute provides that the 
findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of 
fraud, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to 
questions of law. Therefore, on an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board, this Court must ascertain whether the Board’s conclusions 
are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. To prevail on 
appeal, the appellant must show that the Board committed an error of law or 
demonstrate that the findings of the Board are not supported by substantial 
evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is within the discretion of the 
Board, not the Court, to weigh the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting 
testimony. Thus, the Superior Court does not weigh the evidence, determine 
questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. If there is substantial 
evidence and no legal error, the Court will affirm the Board’s decision. 

(18) The Board considered as evidence the handwritten letter of resignation 
allegedly written by Baker as well as other documents used as samples of her 
handwriting. The Board heard testimony from Annie Grillo and Michael Oneschuck 
as to company procedure and their personal actions and observations as they related 
to the facts of this case. In addition, the Board considered the evidence and testimony 
presented to the Appeals Referee below by both parties. The findings of fact by the 
Board were based on the Board’s determination of credibility of the testimony and 
evidence presented before it and the Board’s resolution of conflicting testimony and 
evidence. The Board is free to more readily accept or give greater weight to the 
credibility of one witness over another if it is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. The Board may also make reasonable inferences from the testimony. The 
Board was obligated to weigh the conflicting evidence and make a determination; it 
did so based on the evidence presented. The Board’s findings of fact and 
conclusions as to Bakers qualification and eligibility for unemployment benefits are 
supported by substantial evidence and are free from legal error. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the appeal from the decision 
of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board denying unemployment benefits to 
Tamira D. Baker is DISMISSED. 

/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
President Judge 
cmh 
oc: Prothonotary 
xc: Order distribution