IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWRE 
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY 
CHRISTIAN B. ANDERSON, 
 
Employee-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
COMFORT SUITES 
 
Employer-Appellee 
 
and 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
APPEAL BOARD, 
 
Appellee. 

Date Submitted: January 22, 2004 
Date Decided: February 12, 2004 

O R D E R 

On Appeal of the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 
Decision AFFIRMED. 
Christian B. Anderson, 3236 Seaborn Drive, Mt. Pleasant SC 29466, pro se. 
Mary Paige Bailey, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Carvel 
State Office Building, 820 N. French St., 6th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801, attorney for 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 
Comfort Suites, Attn: Personnel, 1130 Hungry Neck Blvd., Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464, no 
attorney of record. 
JURDEN, J. 

Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and the record in this case, it 
appears to the Court that: 

Procedural History 

1. Appellant Christian B. Anderson ("Anderson" or "claimant") appeals from 
a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("UIAB" or "Board") which 
held that his appeal from the decision of the Claims Deputy was untimely and therefore 
the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the merits of his case. 

2. Anderson was employed as a chief engineer by Comfort Suites ("Comfort 
Suites" or "employer") in Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina, from approximately September 
6, 2002 until December 9, 2002, when his employment was terminated. Comfort Suites 
fired Anderson because he slid down a laundry chute from the third floor. The employer 
cited safety concerns and gross misconduct as the basis for its decision to terminate the 
claimant’s employment. Anderson filed a claim for unemployment benefits on or about 
December 15, 2002.

3. Although Anderson asserted that he went down the laundry chute to see if 
smoke detectors had been installed in the chute, the Claims Deputy noted that Anderson 
had been warned about going down the laundry chute. On January 8, 2003, the Claims 
Deputy determined that under 19 Del. C. § 3315(2) Anderson was not entitled to 
unemployment benefits because he was "discharged from his employment for good 
cause."
 
TIMELINESS ISSUE 

4. The Claims Deputy’s decision was dated and mailed to the claimant on 
January 8, 2003, but Anderson did not file an appeal of that decision until he sent an 
appeal letter by facsimile on February 28, 2003,5 well after the ten (10) day statutory 
period for filing a timely appeal.6 In response, the Department of Labor issued a second 
Notice of Determination on March 10, 2003, which declared the original decision on the 
merits to be "final and binding due to the claimant’s failure to file a timely appeal." The 
matter was then scheduled for a hearing before an Appeals Referee on the sole issue of 
the claimant’s timeliness of appeal.

5. The Referee held a hearing by telephone on March 24, 2003. Anderson 
testified that he never received a copy of the Claims Deputy’s January 8, 2003 
determination. He also testified that he was unaware of that decision until he made 
several calls to the Interstate Unit and was "brought up to date." In a decision mailed on 
March 27, 2003, the Referee determined that the Claims Deputy’s January 8, 2003 
determination was mailed to Anderson’s last known address. The last day to file an 
appeal from that decision was January 18, 2003, and therefore the Referee held that the 
claimant’s appeal filed on February 28, 2003 was untimely. Concluding that there was 
no evidence of any administrative error on the part of the Department of Labor, the 
Referee did not excuse the untimely filing of claimant’s appeal. Accordingly, the 
Referee affirmed the decision of the Claims Deputy.

6. Anderson filed an appeal of the Referee’s decision to the Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board. The Board reviewed the matter and upheld the Referee’s 
decision that Anderson’s first appeal was untimely. This appeal followed. 

Standard of Review 

7. In reviewing a decision on appeal from the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeal Board, this Court must determine if the decision is supported by substantial 
evidence and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence means such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court must uphold the Board’s decision. 

8. "As an appellate court, it [is] not within the province of the Superior Court 
to weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make its own factual 
findings." The Court will only reverse a decision of the Board if its findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence, or where the Board has made a legal mistake. 

9. The Court’s review of the Board’s decision is twofold. First, the Court 
must determine if there are facts to support the finding that the appeal was untimely. 
Second, the Court must determine whether the Board abused its discretion by not 
exercising, sua sponte, its power to review the record for an injustice despite the untimely 
appeal. 

Analysis 

10. Anderson asserts that he was justified in filing his appeal late because he 
never received the Claims Deputy’s January 8, 2003 determination. In support of this 
assertion, the claimant has attached to his brief several exhibits purporting to "establish a 
pattern of incorrect addressing of correspondence" by the Delaware Department of 
Labor. These exhibits were not submitted to the Referee or to the Board. 

11. Anderson admitted at the Referee’s hearing that the Claim’s Deputy’s 
January 8, 2003 determination listed his correct address. A representative from the 
Department of Labor testified that this determination was mailed to that correct address 
and was never returned. Accordingly, the Board found that "[t]here is no evidence of 
error on the part of the Department . . . The Department properly fulfilled its 
responsibility by mailing the determination to claimant’s address of record." The Court 
finds that there is substantial evidence in the record to support this conclusion. 

12. "Properly addressed mail is presumed to be received by the addressee. 
The addressee’s mere denial of receipt of the notice is insufficient to rebut this 
presumption." Here, the decision was properly mailed to the claimant’s correct address 
and it was not returned as "undeliverable." Moreover, there is no evidence of error by an 
employee of the Department of Labor. Based on the above findings, the Board’s 
determination that the notice was properly mailed to the claimant and that the subsequent 
appeal was untimely filed was based on substantial evidence.
 
13. The Board does have authority under 19 Del. C. § 3320 to "act sua sponte 
beyond the ten day appeal period to consider a case where no valid appeal has been filed 
by the parties." However, this authority is used only "where there has been some 
administrative error on the part of the Department of Labor which deprived the claimant 
of the opportunity to file a timely appeal, or in those cases where the interest of justice 
would not be served by inaction." Absent abuse of discretion the Court must uphold a 
decision of an administrative tribunal.
 
14. Although Anderson’s opening brief asserts that the "State of Delaware has 
demonstrated a consistent pattern of carelessness from administrative error in addressing 
correspondence to me from the Delaware Department of Labor Appeals Board," the 
record is void of any administrative error. "Upon appeal from the denial of 
unemployment benefits, the Superior Court is limited to consideration of the record 
which was before the administrative agency." Because the exhibits attached to 
claimant’s opening brief were not a part of that record below, they may not be considered 
now in the Court’s determination of whether the evidence supports the findings of the 
Referee and the Board.
 
15. A decision by an administrative agency is not an abuse of discretion 
"unless it is based on clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds," or the agency 
"exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized 
rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice." The claimant has failed to show any 
error on the part of the Department of Labor that might have delayed the claimant’s 
receipt of the decision or delayed his filing of the appeal. The Board had discretion in 
this matter, and, under the circumstances, it did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 
consider the case sua sponte. 

16. For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Board is supported by 
substantial evidence, is free from legal error, and is not an abuse of discretion. 
Consequently, the decision of the Board is hereby AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 
__________________________________________ 
Jan R. Jurden, Judge