VERONICA L. MARQUAND v. ADMINISTRATOR,
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT

(AC 31347)

DiPentima, C. J., and Bear and Schaller, Js.
Argued June 1—officially released September 21, 2010
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New
Haven, Keegan, J.)

Veronica Marquand, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).
Thomas P. Clifford III, assistant attorney general,
with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal,
attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney
general, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Veronica L. Marquand,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying
her appeal from the decision of the employment security
board of review (board), which had denied her
motion to open for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts. By way of a
letter dated January 25, 2001, the defendant, the administrator
of the Unemployment Compensation Act,
informed the plaintiff that a preliminary determination
had been made that she had been overpaid unemployment
benefits due to her failure to report properly certain
earnings. The administrator subsequently sent a
letter dated March 27, 2001, to the plaintiff, informing
her of the determination that she was, in fact, overpaid
unemployment benefits and that the overpayment
would be assessed to her account. The letter also
informed the plaintiff that, as an administrative penalty,
she would have to forfeit twelve weeks of unemployment
benefits, to which she would otherwise have been
entitled. The letter specifically stated that the determination
was based on a review of the plaintiff’s case file,
as well as her ‘‘failure to request or attend a hearing.’’
The plaintiff replied by letter, dated April 14, 2001, stating
that she had sought a hearing on the matter and
that she wanted to appeal the administrator’s March
27, 2001 decision. The plaintiff’s April 14, 2001 letter
was postmarked April 19, 2001, which was two days
after the time limit for filing an appeal. On May 18,
2001, the appeals referee mailed her decision in which
she found that the plaintiff failed to show good cause
for the late filing of her appeal from the administrator’s
March 27, 2001 decision and, therefore, dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On June 11, 2001, the
plaintiff appealed from the referee’s decision to the
board, and on June 26, 2001, the board dismissed the
plaintiff’s appeal, finding that, pursuant to General Statutes
§ 31-248, the plaintiff’s appeal from the referee’s
decision should have been filed within twenty-one days
after the referee’s decision was mailed. The plaintiff
did not pursue the matter any further.

Several years later, in May, 2008, the plaintiff again
applied for unemployment benefits. The department of
labor informed her that, although she had been awarded
unemployment benefits, the funds were being held as
a result of the administrative penalty that had been
assessed to her account in 2001. On May 31, 2008, the
plaintiff sent a letter to the board regarding the matter,
claiming that she had repaid the amount overpaid to
her as determined by the administrator and that,
because her overpayment was ‘‘[n]on-fraudulent,’’ she
should not have incurred the penalty assessed to her
account. The plaintiff also maintained that she had new
evidence to show that she had made a timely request
in 2001 for a hearing concerning the administrator’s
preliminary determination regarding the overpayment
of benefits to her. The board treated the plaintiff’s May
31, 2008 letter as a late motion to open the board’s June
26, 2001 decision, and on July 18, 2008, it denied the
motion for lack of jurisdiction, finding that there was
no good cause for the late filing.

The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court on
September 8, 2008. On April 20, 2009, the court filed a
memorandum of decision in which it found that the
plaintiff never had the opportunity to show that the
overpayment was not fraudulent. On May 7, 2009, the
defendant filed a motion to reargue, claiming that the
plaintiff’s lack of diligence in pursuing her appeals in
this matter had deprived the board of jurisdiction to
hear her claims. The motion to reargue was granted on
May 20, 2009. Thereafter, on June 25, 2009, the court
filed a memorandum of decision in which it denied the
plaintiff’s appeal. This appeal followed.

‘‘As a preliminary matter, we note the unique place
this type of appeal holds in our appellate jurisprudence.
[A]ppeals from the board to the Superior Court are
specifically exempted from governance by General Statutes
§ 4-166 et seq., the Uniform Administrative Procedure
Act. All appeals from the board to the court are
controlled by [General Statutes] § 31-249b. . . . We
also are mindful of the remedial nature of our state’s
statutory scheme of unemployment compensation.

. . . This remedial purpose, however, does not support
the granting of benefits to an employee guilty of wilful
misconduct. . . .

‘‘We now set forth our standard of review. In appeals
under . . . § 31-249b, the Superior Court does not retry
the facts or hear evidence but rather sits as an appellate
court to review only the record certified and filed by
the board of review. Practice Book § 519 [now § 22-9].
The court is bound by the findings of subordinate facts
and reasonable factual conclusions made by the appeals
referee where . . . the board of review adopted the
findings and affirmed the decision of the referee. . . .
Judicial review of the conclusions of law reached
administratively is also limited. The court’s ultimate
duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence,
the board . . . has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally,
or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Nonetheless,
issues of law afford a reviewing court a broader standard
of review when compared to a challenge to the
factual findings of the referee.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Addona v. Administrator,
Unemployment Compensation Act, 121 Conn.
App. 355, 360–61, 996 A.2d 280 (2010).

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
granted the defendant’s motion to reargue. ‘‘[I]n
reviewing a court’s ruling on a motion to open, reargue,
vacate or reconsider, we ask only whether the court
acted unreasonably or in clear abuse of its discretion.
. . . When reviewing a decision for an abuse of discretion,
every reasonable presumption should be given in
favor of its correctness. . . . As with any discretionary
action of the trial court . . . the ultimate [question for
appellate review] is whether the trial court could have
reasonably concluded as it did. . . . [T]he purpose of
a reargument is . . . to demonstrate to the court that
there is some decision or some principle of law which
would have a controlling effect, and which has been
overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension
of facts. . . . It also may be used to address . . .
claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not
addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to reargue
[however] is not to be used as an opportunity to have
a second bite of the apple . . . .’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Gianetti v. Gianetti,
122 Conn. App. 126, 129, 998 A.2d 807 (2010). In the
motion to reargue, the defendant ‘‘argued that the
court’s prior ruling failed to give the appropriate weight
to the strict statutory standards for appeals, and the
long line of case law in support of that view.’’ Because
this is a proper basis for a motion to reargue, the court
did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s
motion to reargue.

The plaintiff also makes numerous other claims concerning
error in the court’s judgment.1 Essentially, the
only issue for the court to determine was whether the
board acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in
abuse of its discretion when it denied the plaintiff’s
motion to open for lack of jurisdiction and found that
there was no good cause for the late filing. General
Statutes § 31-249a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any
decision of the board, in the absence of a timely filed
appeal from a party aggrieved thereby or a timely filed
motion to reopen, vacate, set aside or modify such
decision from a party aggrieved thereby, shall become
final on the thirty-first calendar day after the date on
which a copy of the decision is mailed to the party,
provided . . . any such appeal or motion which is filed
after such thirty-day period may be considered to be
timely filed if the filing party shows good cause, as
defined in regulations adopted pursuant to section 31-
249h, for the late filing . . . . (b) Any decision of the
board may be reopened, vacated, set aside, or modified
on the timely filed motion of a party aggrieved by such
decision, or on the board’s own timely filed motion, on
grounds of new evidence or if the ends of justice so
require upon good cause shown. . . .’’ On the basis of
the record, we conclude that there was ample evidence
to support the board’s decision that the plaintiff failed
to file a timely appeal both with the referee and with
the board and that no good cause exists for the late
filing of the motion to open. Accordingly, the court
properly denied the plaintiff’s appeal.

The judgment is affirmed.