LIRI BELICA v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION ACT

(AC 32020)

Beach, Alvord and Mihalakos, Js.

Argued November 18, 2010—officially released March 1, 2011
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
Waterbury, Sheedy, J.)

Thomas P. Clifford III, assistant attorney general,
with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal,
former attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant
attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).
Liri Belica, pro se, the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

BEACH, J. The defendant administrator of the Unemployment
Compensation Act appeals from the judgment
of the Superior Court sustaining the appeal by the plaintiff,
Liri Belica, from the determination of the employment
security board of review (board) denying the
plaintiff unemployment compensation benefits. On
appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in
holding that a motion to reopen the board’s decision
should have been treated as a motion to correct the
findings of the board pursuant to Practice Book § 22-
4.1 We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of
the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. On
April 7, 2008, the plaintiff sustained an injury during
the course of his employment and began collecting
workers’ compensation benefits during an ensuing
leave of absence. While the plaintiff was on the leave
of absence, his employer obligated him to follow a treatment
plan, which required him to attend two physical
therapy sessions per week in addition to several independent
medical examinations (examinations).2 The
workers’ compensation carrier of his employer mailed
the plaintiff three separate certified notices to attend
examinations on June 17, July 15, and August 27, 2008.
The plaintiff, however, failed to attend any of the three
scheduled examinations. He claimed that he did not
receive any mail notifications and that he did not consider
the examinations to be a part of the treatment
plan.3 The plaintiff also alleged that he spoke to Robin
Barrows, a representative of the workers’ compensation
carrier of his employer, on multiple occasions and
could not recall if she told him to attend any of his
scheduled examinations.

On October 8, 2008, the day after his leave of absence
had expired, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated
as a result of his failure to attend the scheduled examinations.
4 The plaintiff thereafter filed a claim for unemployment
compensation benefits. On November 24,
2008, the defendant denied the plaintiff’s claim. It concluded
that his failure to attend the scheduled examinations
constituted wilful misconduct. The plaintiff
appealed from the decision of the defendant to the
appeals referee. Hearings were held on December 17,
2008, and January 7, 2009. The appeals referee reversed
the decision of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff
was entitled to receive benefits. Specifically, the
referee found that the employer failed to establish that
the plaintiff received the mail notifications of the scheduled
examinations or that the examinations were part
of the plaintiff’s treatment plan.

The defendant appealed from that decision to the
board on January 27, 2009. On March 27, 2009, the board
issued a decision sustaining the defendant’s appeal. In
its decision, the board adopted the referee’s findings
of fact and made several additional factual findings.5
First, the board determined that the examinations were
a part of the plaintiff’s treatment plan and that the
plaintiff should have known this because he previously
collected workers’ compensation benefits and was
familiar with the requirement that he submit to the
examinations. Second, the board found that during a
telephone conversation with Barrows, the plaintiff was
informed that he was required to attend an appointment
for an examination. Finally, the board found that in
addition to the certified mail notifications sent to the
plaintiff by the workers’ compensation carrier of the
employer, a third party provider also mailed the plaintiff
notifications of the three scheduled examinations. On
the basis of these factual findings, the board determined
that the plaintiff’s failure to attend the examinations
was deliberate and constituted wilful misconduct; thus,
he was not entitled to receive benefits. On April 27,
2009, the plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the board’s
decision, which the board denied on June 19, 2009. The
plaintiff did not file a motion to correct the findings of
the board.

The plaintiff appealed from the board’s decision to
the Superior Court on August 5, 2009. The court conducted
a hearing on December 29, 2009, at which it
heard arguments from the plaintiff and the defendant.6
In its February 9, 2010 memorandum of decision, the
court acknowledged the defendant’s argument that in
the absence of the filing of a motion to correct pursuant
to Practice Book § 22-4,7 the court was obligated to
accept the board’s factual findings. The court disagreed,
however, and concluded that the plaintiff’s motion to
reopen the judgment of the board was a valid substitute
for a motion to correct. The court reasoned that ‘‘[f]ollowing
the mailing of the board’s decision, the [plaintiff]
filed a timely motion to reopen the decision. . . . To
conclude [that] the [plaintiff] did not file a motion for
correction of the findings as the [defendant] urges this
court to so find given the inclusion in the certified
record of the [plaintiff’s] motion to reopen . . . is to
deny the existence of that document and to exhalt form
over substance.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) The court then determined that, on the
basis of the record, the board abused its discretion in
determining that the plaintiff received notice of the
scheduled examinations. The court thus sustained the
plaintiff’s appeal and remanded the matter to the board
with instruction to ‘‘remand the case to a referee for a
hearing consistent with the record certified to [the]
court by the board.’’ This appeal followed.8
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred
in concluding that the plaintiff’s filing of a motion to
reopen the decision of the board was a valid substitute
for a motion to correct findings pursuant to Practice
Book § 22-4. The defendant argues that Practice Book
§ 22-4 obligated the court to accept the findings of the
board. We agree.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review.
‘‘[R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires
a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence
in the administrative record to support the
agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions
drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . . Neither
this court nor the trial court may retry the case or
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency on the weight of the evidence or questions
of fact. . . . Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view
of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing
its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in
abuse of its discretion. . . . [A]n agency’s factual and
discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable
weight by the courts.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) JSF Promotions, Inc. v.
Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act,
265 Conn. 413, 417–18, 828 A.2d 609 (2003).

This court’s decision in Calnan v. Administrator,
Unemployment Compensation Act, 43 Conn. App. 779,
686 A.2d 134 (1996), controls the issue before us. In
Calnan, we stated that ‘‘appeals from the board to the
Superior Court are specifically exempted from governance
by General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act. All appeals from the
board to the court are controlled by General Statutes
§ 31-249b. Section 31-249b specifically provides that any
finding of the board shall be subject to correction only
to the extent provided by section 519 [now § 22-9] of
the Connecticut Practice Book. . . . Practice Book
§ 519 (a) [now § 22-9 (a)] specifies that the trial court
does not retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers
no evidence other than that certified to it by the board,
and then for the limited purpose of determining whether
. . . there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions
reached. [The court] cannot review the conclusions
of the board when these depend upon the weight
of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. . . .
Practice Book § 515A [now § 22-4] provides the mechanism
for the correction of the board’s findings. If the
appellant desires that the findings be corrected, the
appellant must, within two weeks of the filing of the
record in the Superior Court, file with the board a
motion for correction of the findings.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Shah v. Administrator, Unemployment
Compensation Act, 114 Conn. App. 170, 175,
968 A.2d 971 (2009), quoting Calnan v. Administrator,
Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 783–84.
Our Supreme Court has adopted this rule, stating that
a plaintiff’s ‘‘failure to file a timely motion for correction
of the board’s findings in accordance with [Practice
Book] § 22-4 prevents further review of those facts
found by the board.’’ JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator,
Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 265
Conn. 422. This court has relied on Calnan multiple
times in concluding that a plaintiff’s failure to file a
timely motion to correct the board’s findings pursuant
to Practice Book § 22-4 was dispositive of the appeal.
See Shah v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation
Act, supra, 114 Conn. App. 175–77; Reeder v.
Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 88
Conn. App. 556, 869 A.2d 1288, cert. denied, 275 Conn.
918, 883 A.2d 1245 (2005); see also Chavez v. Administrator,
Unemployment Compensation Act, 44 Conn.
App. 105, 686 A.2d 1014 (1995) (motion to correct
required under Calnan to challenge board’s findings
on appeal).

In the present case, the plaintiff’s appeal to the Superior
Court challenged only the board’s factual determinations.
In his appeal to the Superior Court, the plaintiff
claimed that there was no evidence in the record to
support the board’s finding that Barrow informed him
over the telephone that he was required to attend an
examination, that a letter introduced into evidence was
unreliable and that the employer’s reason for discharging
him was pretextual. Because those allegations
involve findings of the board, the court lacked authority
to consider the plaintiff’s challenge to those findings
in the absence of a timely motion to correct pursuant to
Practice Book § 22-4. Accordingly, because the plaintiff
failed to file a timely motion to correct, the court did not
have the authority to consider the plaintiff’s challenge of
the board’s findings.

This court recently has stated that it has ‘‘always
been solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants and, like
the trial court, will endeavor to see that such a litigant
shall have the opportunity to have his case fully and
fairly heard so far as such latitude is consistent with
the just rights of any adverse party. . . . Although we
will not entirely disregard our rules of practice, we do
give great latitude to pro se litigants in order that justice
may both be done and be seen to be done. . . . For
justice to be done, however, any latitude given to pro
se litigants cannot interfere with the rights of other
parties, nor can we disregard completely our rules
of practice.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction,
107 Conn. App. 507, 512–13, 946 A.2d 252, cert.
denied, 289 Conn. 902, 957 A.2d 870 (2008). Although
the court attempted to afford the plaintiff some leeway
as a pro se litigant, the fact remains that he failed to
file a motion to correct pursuant to Practice Book § 22-
4.9 Accordingly, the court did not appropriately consider
the plaintiff’s challenge of the board’s findings.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to render judgment for the defendant.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.