ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION IV

DONALD L. LEFTWICH

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT and WHITE RIVER MEDICAL CENTER

APPELLEES

E 99-80

FEBRUARY 9, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW

REVERSED

The Board of Review affirmed the denial of unemployment insurance benefits to the appellant, Donald L. Leftwich, on the basis that the appellee, White River Medical Center (WRMC), discharged appellant for misconduct connected with the work. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Board's conclusion. We must reverse the Board's decision on the merits because it was not supported by the evidence.

The Employment Security Department disqualified appellant from receiving benefits pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513 (a) (Repl. 1996), finding that appellant had voluntarily quit his last work without good cause connected with the work. Appellant filedan appeal with the Appeal Tribunal, and a telephone hearing was held. The Appeal Tribunal

modified the Department's determination and held that appellant had been discharged for misconduct connected with the work pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514 (a) (Repl. 1996). Appellant filed an appeal to the Board of Review, which rendered a decision on April 5, 1999, affirming the Appeal Tribunal.

Appellant worked as an x-ray technician for the North Arkansas Clinic for approximately eight years. In February 1996, WRMC purchased the North Arkansas Clinic. Upon this transfer of ownership, appellant's duties changed to also include transporting patients and completing clerical duties. Around September 1998, WRMC placed appellant on probation because of alleged complaints concerning his work. On or about November 2, 1998, appellant's supervisor, Robert Wright, held a counseling session with appellant to discuss the alleged complaints. At the meeting, appellant stated that he had written rebuttals for the alleged complaints. Wright testified that he instructed appellant to retrieve the documentation and told appellant he would be suspended without pay for three days. Wright further instructed appellant to return on November 6, 1998, with his documentation to rebut the complaints. Darrell Scott, who was also present at the November 2 meeting, testified that Wright did not advise appellant that he was terminated at that time. Appellant did not attend the November 6 meeting and instead filed for unemployment benefits.

In appeals of unemployment compensation cases, the findings of fact by the Board of Review are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, and our review is limited to determining whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence beforeit. Hiner v. Director, 61 Ark. App. 139, 965 S.W.2d 785 (1998); Rodriguez v. Director, 59 Ark. App. 8, 952 S.W.2d 186 (1997). Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This court reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in a light most favorable to the Board of Review's findings. Rucker v. Director, 52 Ark. App. 126, 915 S.W.2d 315 (1996). We do not conduct a de novo review in appeals from the Board of Review. Even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, our review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could have reasonably reached its decision based upon the evidence before it. Cowan v. Director, 56 Ark. App. 17, 936 S.W.2d 766 (1997).

Appellant's challenge to the Board's denial of benefits requires a review of the Board's findings. The "findings of fact" must be sufficient to permit a meaningful review; a "finding" is a simple, straightforward statement of what happened. Lowe v. Car Care Mktg., 53 Ark. App. 100, 919 S.W.2d 520 (1996). Here, the Board sufficiently discussed the merits of the case in its written decision.

The Board of Review found that appellant had been discharged for misconduct in connection with his work pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514 (a) (Repl. 1996). An individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he is discharged for misconduct in connection with the work. "Misconduct," for purposes of unemployment compensation, involves: (1) disregard of the employer's interest; (2) violation of the employer's rules; (3) disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect; and (4) disregard of theemployee's duties and obligations to his employer. Rucker, supra. There is an element of intent associated with a determination of misconduct. Mere good-faith errors in judgment or discretion and unsatisfactory conduct are not considered misconduct unless they are of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional disregard of the employer's interest. Id. Whether an employee's acts are willful or merely the result of unsatisfactory conduct or unintentional failure of performance is a fact question for the Board to decide. Id.

Here, we cannot say that appellant was in fact "discharged," and moreover, we cannot find sufficient evidence to support a finding that appellant was "discharged for misconduct connected with the work." After reviewing the abstract on appeal, we are unable to say that the Board's decision was supported by sufficient evidence.

Reversed.

Bird and Roaf, JJ., agree.